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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900218-CA 
Priority No. 13 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In pretext search cases, under Article I section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, should courts consider the subjective intent of 
the searching officer? 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals7 decision and the trial court's ruling 
are in Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals filed the Velasquez decision on 
April 1, 1991. This petition is timely under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 48(a). 
This Court's statutory jurisdiction over this petition for 
certiorari is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(a) and 
(5) (Supp. 1990). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following constitutional provision is contained in the 
body of this petition: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 (1953) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Mr. Velasquez was charged with two counts of possession of 
controlled substances (R. 8-9). After the trial court denied his 
motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police (R. 28-33), 
Mr. Velasquez entered a conditional no contest plea to one 
possession count, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the 
motion to suppress (R. 36-43). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of 
the motion to dismiss. 
B. FACTS 
The issue before the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
was the pretextual nature of Officer Hedenstrom's conduct in 
stopping Mr. Velasquez and searching his car. See Appendix 2, 
containing the motion to suppress filed in the trial court, and the 
table of contents in Mr. Velasquez's opening brief in the Court of 
Appeals. In apparent reliance on State v. Sierra's rule that the 
subjective intent of the searching officer is not to be considered, 
754 P.2d 972, 977-979 and n.3, the trial court cind the Court of 
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Appeals did not consider the following evidence of Officer 
Hedenstrom's pretextual intent: 
Officer Hedenstrom did not stop Mr. Velasquez's car when 
Officer Hedenstrom first noticed the mismatched license plates, as 
Mr. Velasquez was parking the car on State Street (T. 3-4). 
Officer Hedenstrom explained why he did not cite 
Mr. Velasquez for the mismatched plates: "The rear plate was the 
correct plate." (T. 12). Officer Hedenstrom did not testify about 
when he ascertained that the rear plate was correct (for example, if 
he called in the registration after he noticed the car parking on 
9th South and State Street, and before the stop). 
Officer Hedenstrom indicated he decided to arrest 
Mr. Velasquez for "no license" and that the decision to arrest was 
within his discretion (T. 9-10). Prior to and during the search of 
the car, Mr. Velasquez apparently was not taken by Officer Mosier 
(who had a separate patrol car from Officer Hedenstrom) to the 
police station for "no license" but apparently was held until the 
search was complete—he was booked for "no license" and for 
possession of a controlled substance (T. 8-9). 
Officer Hedenstrom produced no inventory policy and 
indicated that the inventory sheet was not produced with the police 
reports and that he did not have a copy of the inventory sheet 
(T. 11, 14). Officer Hedenstrom maintained that his performance of 
the impound-inventory search complied with department policy 
(T. 14), explaining that, as a matter of policy, impounded vehicles 
- 3 -
are searched "for valuables and any evidence." (T. 6) (emphasis 
added). 
REASON WHY QUESTION PRESENTED JUSTIFIES ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
This Court should grant certiorari on the question, because 
Utah law in pretext cases, following confused federal precedent, is 
inconsistent. This Court should clarify that under Article I 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution,1 evidence of the officer's 
subjective intent is relevant in pretext search cases. 
A. PRETEXT CASE LAW IS CONFUSING. 
The role of subjective intent of the officer in pretext 
cases involves a great deal of confusing case law and has spawned a 
fair amount of scholarly debate. Appendix 3 to this petition 
contains an article giving an overview of the case law and 
commentary, Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After 
Never Leaving," 66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363 (1989), hereinafter 
"Burkoff article".2 
1. Article I section 14 provides, "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized." 
2. See also LaFave, Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages 
80 through 97, and pages 12 through 14 of the supplement; section 
5.2(e), pages 456 through 461 and pages 47 through 48 of the 
supplement; section 7.5(e), pages 141 through 145 and pages 15 and 
16 of the supplement; Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now 
You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 (1984); Burkoff, 
(footnote continued) 
- 4 -
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the 
Utah Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the subjective intent 
of the officer is irrelevant, and repeatedly emphasized that the 
inquiry under the fourth amendment must be objective. .Id. at 
977-979 and n.3. The Sierra Court's objective assessment rule is an 
accurate quotation of Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), 
"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and 
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the 
time the challenged action was taken." 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 
2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (quoting Scott v. 
United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). 
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977.3 
However, in federal cases prior to and subsequent to Scott, 
the United States Supreme Court has evaluated the subjective intent 
of the officer in determining whether a fourth amendment violation 
(footnote 2 continued) 
"Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982); A. Eisemann Note, 
63 B.U.L.Rev. 223 (1983); Haddad, "Pretextual Fourth Amendment 
Activity: Another Viewpoint," 18 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 639 (1985); and 
Burkoff, "Rejoinder: Truth, Justice and the American Way—Or 
Professor Haddad's 'Hard Choices,7" 18 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 695 (1985). 
3. It is arguable that the objectivity rule in Scott is 
dicta, see Burkoff article at 366-368; Burkoff, "Bad Faith 
Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 83-84 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext 
Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 
523 (1984) ; and that the legal underpinnings of that dicta are 
wanting, see LaFave, Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages 81-83; 
A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983); Burkoff, "Bad 
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982). 
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has occurred.4 
But in other cases, the Court has repeated the Scott 
objective test relied on by the court in Sierra.5 
Utah case law following the federal precedents is also 
confusing. It seems that while the Court of Appeals maintains that 
reference to the officer's subjective state of mind is 
inappropriate, in practice, the court has found reference to the 
officer's subjective state of mind helpful in assessing allegations 
of pretext stops.6 
4. See e.g. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 
(1958); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960); Ker v. 
California. 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 
(1980) (per curiam); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 
(1981); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (plurality 
opinion); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1987); 
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85, 87 (1987); O'Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (plurality opinion). See also 
Burkoff article at 366-367, 394-408 (1989); Burkoff, "Bad Faith 
Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 75-83 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext 
Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 
523, 544-548 (1984); A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 
(1983). 
5. See e.g. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 
579, 584 n.3 (1983); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S„ 463, 471 (1985). 
See also Burkoff article at 369-372; Burkoff, "The Pretext Search 
Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 
524-525, 528-532 (1984). 
6. See e.g. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("Furthermore, unlik€> the officer in Sierra, Trooper 
Avery was not suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before 
the stop, had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull 
him over, and before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle."); 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979-980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Our 
conclusion that a reasonable officer would not have stopped Sierra 
for traveling in the left lane is buttressed by the events preceding 
Officer Smith's seizure of Sierra's automobile. As previously 
(footnote continued) 
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B. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT OF AN OFFICER 
SHOULD BE ONE FACTOR OPEN TO CONSIDERATION IN PRETEXT CASES. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Court 
explicitly held that under the Utah Constitution, "exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I section 14." Id. at 472 (emphasis added). 
But see Larocco at 473 (indicating that further development of the 
exclusionary rule under the State Constitution might lead to 
recognition of exceptions to the rule). 
The necessary exclusion of evidence under the Utah 
Constitution is the reason that the federal Scott limitation of 
subjective intent evidence should be rejected. Under the federal 
fourth amendment Scott decision, the subjective intent of the 
officer is not entirely irrelevant, but is pertinent to determining 
whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy. The Scott 
Court stated, 
(footnote 6 continued) 
stated, Officer Smith was suspicious of Sierra before he observed 
Sierra commit any purported traffic violation. He had radioed for a 
computer check of the car's license plate but found it was not 
stolen. Nevertheless, he radioed for back-up assistance and 
exceeded the posted speed limit to catch Sierra."). See also 
Burkoff article at 375 and n.56 (citing four Utah cases in which 
"motivational evidence" is used in pretext cases); State v. Lovearen 
and Southern. 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), at 768 and n.3 
(examining the officer's actual purpose) and at 771 n.10 ("While the 
individual officer's own practice may well be probative of what the 
hypothetical reasonable officer would do under the circumstances, 
his characterization of his intent at the time is essentially 
irrelevant.") (emphasis added, citation omitted). But see State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (disregarding the 
motivation of the officer, apparently because a traffic violation 
was actually committed and a hypothetical officer would have made 
the stop). 
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This is not to say, of course, that the 
question of motive plays absolutely no part in 
the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the motive 
with which the officer conducts an illegal search 
may have some relevance in determining the 
propriety of applying the exclusionary rule. For 
example, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
458, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), we 
ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized by 
state police could be introduced in federal civil 
tax proceedings because "the imposition of the 
exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to provide 
significant, much less substantial, additional 
deterrence. It falls outside the offending 
officer's zone of primary interest." See also 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 
276-277, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054 (1978). 
This focus on intent, however, becomes relevant 
only after it has been determined that the 
Constitution was in fact violated. We also have 
little doubt that as a practical matter the 
judge's assessment of the motives of the officers 
may occasionally influence his judgment regarding 
the credibility of the officers7 claims with 
respect to what information was or was not 
available to them at the time of the incident in 
question. But the assessment and use of motive 
in this limited manner is irrelevant to our 
analysis of the questions at issue in this case. 
436 U.S. 128, 139 n.13.7 
Because exclusion of evidence is a necessary consequence of 
an Article I section 14 violation, the Scott rule, limiting the 
relevance of the officer's subjective intent to the exclusion 
question, does not apply. 
There are several reasons why this Court should explicitly 
hold that an officer's subjective intent is relevant to pretext 
cases under Article I section 14. Assuming that deterrence of 
7. For criticism of this two-step approach, see Burkoff, 
"The Court that Swallowed the Fourth Amendment," 58 Ore.L.Rev. 151, 
187-190 (1979). 
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police misconduct is one of the bases for the Utah exclusionary 
rule, see State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 473 (Utah 1990), a police 
officer's improper behavior should not be protected from scrutiny by 
reference to fiction (the hypothetical reasonable officer/objective 
test). 
Such hypothetical justification might draw a court into the 
privacy violation. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 
1990) (one purpose of the federal exclusionary rule is to "prevent 
making a court a 'party to lawless invasions of the constitutional 
rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the 
fruits of such invasions.'") (quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 13 
(1968)). 
If evidence of the officer's state of mind is to be ignored 
in the application of the deterrent exclusionary rule, it seems that 
resort to less reliable and relevant criteria becomes necessary. Is 
the pretext inquiry logically focused on whether a traffic violation 
actually occurred?8 Is the pretext inquiry logically focused on 
whether the traffic violation is legally prohibited?9 Is the 
8. Compare State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 ("[W]e are 
unable to assess whether Sierra even violated Utah's left-lane 
provisions. The trial judge did not find that Sierra had violated 
any traffic statutes.") with Sierra at 978-979 (recognizing that 
even actual traffic violations may be used as subterfuge 
justifications for pretextual stops). 
9. Compare State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("Courts consistently have held that a police officer can 
stop a vehicle when he or she believes the vehicle's safety 
equipment is not functioning properly.") (emphasis added), with 
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("The proper 
inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly have 
made the stop.") (emphasis in original). 
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pretext inquiry logically focused on the frequency with which 
similar stops have been made by the officer in question or other 
officers or by a hypothetical officer?10 
C. THIS CASE PROVIDES AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE 
LAW. 
In seeking to suppress the evidence seized in the search 
conducted by Officer Hedenstrom, Mr. Velasquez relied on Article I 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and focused on the pretextual 
nature of Officer Hedenstrom's conduct (R. 25). 1 1 At the hearing on 
the motion to suppress, defense counsel referred State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), providing the court with a copy 
of Sierra, and asking the court to read the cases prior to ruling on 
10. See State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 and n. 2 
(noting that the officer in question and other officers do not 
frequently stop cars for the violation in question); Burkoff, "Bad 
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70# 110 (1982) (noting that 
standard police practices may be unconstitutional, that there may be 
valid reasons to depart from standard police preictices that have 
nothing to do with pretextual motivations). 
11. Mr. Velasquez did not explicitly argue that the Court 
should clarify the law, recognizing the subjective intent of the 
officer as a pertinent consideration under Article I section 14. 
This is explained by the fact that this case was heard on March 20 
and 22, 1990, before the filing of State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah May 30, 1990). See State v. Harcrraves, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (court addressed search and seizure issue for 
the first time on appeal because the case was heard prior to the 
filing of a determinative decision by this Court). See also 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 533 (Vt. 1985) (appellate court will 
require rebriefing of state constitutional issues if they have not 
yet been raised adequately); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1986) (citing Jewett with approval on topic of state constitutional 
analysis). 
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the motion (T. 15). Defense counsel addressed the pretext issue as 
follows, 
In addition to that, Judge, the other thing 
is to, and you will see that in the State v, 
Sierra, they have indicated, yes, a police 
officer may however stop an automobile for a 
traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence. Well, it had two different plates on 
it, although it was properly registered. 
But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977: 
"It is impermissible for law enforcement officers 
to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime." 
It is our position that that is what 
occurred here, Judge, and the items that were 
found ought to be suppressed. 
(T. 17-18). 
The prosecutor acknowledged and disputed defense counsel's 
contention that the stop was pretextual and argued that the search 
was a proper inventory search (T. 15-16, 20). 
The trial court apparently recognized the objective test 
discussed in Sierra, stating, 
We have a car with different license 
plates. We have the officer not remembering if 
there was a registration or not. We have the 
defendant without a driver's license, and so what 
would the reasonable officer do if he pulls 
anyone over at that point? I haven't heard 
anything. If he hadn't had a registration, then 
it certainly would have been justified to impound 
the car. You don't know if it is stolen, or you 
don't know what the story is. 
[the prosecutor]: Or if the driver was under 
arrest, Your Honor, and there was no one else 
there that could drive the car away 
[the court]: The problem I have with that, is 
everyone that is driving a car without a driver's 
license arrested and taken to jail? That is kind 
of—Maybe they ought to be, but I am kind of 
shocked why—What's the circumstances here? 
There has to be something articulable. 
- 11 -
(T. 20-21). 
In apparent reliance on Sierra's ban of consideration of 
evidence of the officer's subjective intent, neither the trial court 
nor the Court of Appeals recognized evidence of Officer Hedenstrom's 
pretextual subjective intent. Officer Hedenstrom's claim that he 
stopped the car because it was improperly registered, as evidenced 
by the mismatched license plates, is undermined: Officer Hedenstrom 
did not approach Mr. Velasquez concerning the improper indicia of 
registration when he first observed it, when the car was in the 
process of parking on State Street (T. 3-4); and Officer Hedenstrom 
did not cite Mr. Velasquez for improper indicia of registration 
(T. 12). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the stop was proper, the search 
was not a valid inventory search, because Officer Hedenstrom 
testified that one of his purposes in conducting the search was to 
gather evidence (T. 6). See State v. Hycrh, 711 P.2d 264, 267-268 
(Utah 1985) ("the inventory excerption does not apply when the 
inventory is merely a 'pretext concealing an investigatory police 
motive.'"). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Velasquez requests that this Court grant a writ of 
certiorari on the question. 
- 12 -
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1991. 
Mr. Velasquez 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this day of May, 1991, 
DELIVERED by 
of May, 1991. 
this day 
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APPENDIX 1 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals and 
Ruling of the Trial Court 
APR 1J991 
MaVT.Noonsn 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900218-CA 
F I L E D 
(Apr i l 1, 1991) 
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PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of possessing cocaine 
and heroin. He challenges denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence of the drugs seized in an inventory search of his 
vehicle, impounded for improper licensing and registration. He 
claims that the initial stop and subsequent inventory search 
were conducted as a pretext to search for drugs. 
Although the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress is 
-fact-sensitive,- State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
findings in its pretrial ruling. The arresting officer was the 
only witness to testify at the pretrial hearing. Consequently, 
we state the facts based upon the officer's testimony in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. 
Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
The officer testified that he first noted defendant's 
vehicle parked with different numbered license plates attached 
to the front and rear. A short time later, the officer 
observed defendant driving the same improperly licensed vehicle 
on the street. Because of the disparate license plates and 
apparent improper registration, the officer stopped defendant's 
vehicle. When requested by the officer, defendant could not 
produce a valid driver's license and said he did not have one. 
He did produce a copy of a prior traffic citation issued to a 
Jeff Martinez wherein he had been cited for driving without a 
driver's license. During this stop, the defendant gave 
different names to the officer. No evidence was offered at the 
hearing as to whether there was a valid registration card in 
the vehicle. 
Based upon these events and defendant's admissions, the 
officer arrested defendant for driving without a license and 
giving false information to an officer. Because defendant was 
alone, the car was on a public street and was improperly 
licensed, the automobile was impounded. The officer testified 
that police department procedures were followed in impounding 
the vehicle and conducting an inventory of its contents. 
During the inventory, an unlocked cash box was found on the 
floor by the driver's seat. The officer opened the box to 
ascertain its contents and found heroin and cocaine powder, 
along with drug paraphernalia. Defendant was booked for and 
charged with driving without a driver's license, giving false 
information to the police officer, and possessing the 
controlled substances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-43(1) (1988) requires the issuance 
of "two identical registration plates" for every automobile. 
Plates issued for use on a vehicle may not be removed from the 
vehicle and used upon an other vehicle. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-47 (1988) requires every automobile owner to attach one 
license plate to the front of the car and a matching license 
plate to the rear. The automobile driven by defendant at the 
time of the stop had different plates attached to the front and 
rear. Defendant clearly violated the law by operating this car 
on the public streets. The officer had both a right and duty-
to stop defendant's vehicle because of his significant 
registration violation. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The stop was a valid stop based upon objective facts and 
not a pretext based upon some subjective intent to search for 
drugs. The mere argument that he was stopped to search for 
drugs is speculation without support in the record. Defendant 
was stopped for violating the law in the officer's presence and 
there is no evidence that defendant was stopped for any other 
purpose. 
When stopped, defendant could not produce a valid 
driver's license. He did produce a prior citation that he had 
previously been arrested for driving without a license. He 
also gave the officer different names. After defendant had 
given false information to the officer and had driven, even 
though recently ticketed for illegally driving, defendant's 
arrest was not an abuse of the officer's statutory discretion 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-165 to -166 (1988), 77-7-2(1)(3) 
and 77-7-18 (1990). Obviously, defendant's prior ticket had 
not deterred him from driving without a license. 
The impoundment of the vehicle was reasonably justified 
because defendant was alone, the vehicle had improperly 
registered license plates, and could not be left on the 
street. See State v. Hvoh. 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985). 
Police are justified in inventorying such vehicles at the time 
of impoundment. South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 
(1976); Cadv v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Based 
upon the totality of the circumstances, the officer was 
justified in arresting defendant and impounding his car. 
The officer testified that he followed departmental 
policy and procedures in the vehicle impoundment and in the 
subsequent inventory taken. Defendant produced no evidence to 
the contrary. Nor does defendant show that the departmental 
procedures followed by the officer in some manner offend either 
the federal or state constitutions. Defendant complains that 
the prosecution failed to introduce "documentation- to support 
the officer's testimony. Defendant does not say what 
••documentation" should have been produced or what its ultimate 
value was. Suffice it to say that defendant failed to 
challenge in any way the officer's testimony that he followed 
established policy. Having elicited unchallenged testimony of 
the officer's adherence to police department policy, the 
prosecutor was not required to produce at trial copies of the 
written policy or an inventory sheet. If defendant believes . 
that these documents were of value to his defense, he should 
have asked for them and presented them to the trial court. 
Because defendant completely failed to factually challenge the 
officer's testimony, we see no need to remand the case for 
further findings, as the state suggests. 
In State v. Sterqer, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 32 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) this court approved the opening of closed containers 
in an inventory search when specifically required by search 
guidelines. In this case as in Steroer, evidence was 
uncontradicted that the officer followed standardized search 
procedures in conducting an inventory of the vehicle's contents. 
We affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress. Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Third Juv.-it-.;a: CUif j j l : 
MAR 2 1 1990 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CIVIL NO. 901900313 FS 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on March 
20, 1990. The defendant was present with counsel and 
interpreter, and the State was represented by its counsel. 
Evidence was received, the case argued, and authorities relied 
upon presented by both counsel. The Court took the matter 
under advisement. 
The Court now rules as follows. 
The only witness, the arresting officer, testified that the 
motor vehicle driven by the defendant had different license 
plates on the front and rear, therefore, he pulled it over. 
The driver could not produce a driver's license. He did 
produce a prior traffic citation wherein he had been cited for 
having no driver's license. During this stop, the defendant 
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gave different names to the officer. No evidence was offered 
as to whether or not there was a registration card in the 
vehicle. 
Based upon the above, the officer arrested the defendant. 
Since he was alone, the automobile was impounded. Following 
police department procedures, an inventory was made of the 
automobile wherein a cash box was found on the floor by the 
driver's seat containing a substance believed to be a 
controlled substance, and paraphernalia in relationship to the 
same. Defendant was booked for driving without a driver's 
license, giving false information to the police officer, and 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Defendant argues that the stop was a pretext to 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and, 
therefore, the fruits of such illegal search should be 
suppressed. 
The State argues that the stop was not a pretext for a 
search, but for violation of the law in the presence of the 
officer. The search that occurred was an inventory search in 
relationship to impounding the vehicle. 
Section 41-1-43, Utah Code Ann., requires the issuance of 
"two identical registration plates" for every motor vehicle 
coo 
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other than a motorcycle, trailer, etc. The said Section 
further provides that the plates so issued may not be removed 
from the vehicle or used upon any other vehicle. 
Section 41-1-48, Utah Code Ann., requires that every motor 
vehicle, except a motorcycle, trailer, etc., shall have 
attached to the front of the vehicle one license plate, and the 
other license plate to the rear. 
The automobile driven by the defendant at the time of the 
stop had different license plates attached to the front and 
rear of the car. Therefore, operation of such car would be in 
violation of the law. The officer had a right, and a duty, to 
stop this motor vehicle because of this violation of law. 
Therefore, the stopping of this vehicle was a valid stop. 
Upon further inquiry, the driver of the automobile could 
not produce a driver's license, but did produce a prior 
citation indicating he had previously been arrested for driving 
without a license. He also gave the officer different names. 
Based upon all of the above, the officer was justified in 
arresting the defendant and booking him. The stopping of this 
vehicle was not a mere pretext to searching of the automobile. 
The stop was made for violation of the law in the presence of 
the officer. The subsequent arrest and booking were justified 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
GG030 
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The impounding of the vehicle was justified since the 
defendant was alone and the vehicle could not be left on the 
streets. Police authorities are justified in making an 
inventory of such vehicles at the time of impounding. As 
stated in South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1000 (1976) : 
When vehicles are impounded, local police 
departments generally follow a routine 
practice of securing and inventorying the 
automobile's contents. These procedures 
developed in response to three distinct 
needs: the protection of the owner's 
property while in remains in police 
custody... the protection of the police 
against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property... and the protection of the 
police from potential danger.... The 
practice has been viewed as essential to 
respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. 
The above court went on to state that such caretaking 
procedures have been uniformly upheld by state courts 
throughout the various jurisdictions, and that the majority of 
the federal courts of appeals have likewise "sustained 
inventory procedures as reasonable police intrusions." The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the police inventory of an 
impounded vehicle under the facts of that case. 
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We hold that the stop was valid, as was the arrest, and 
that the inventory by the police authorities of the automobile 
in this case was justified because the car was being 
impounded. The inventory was justified for the reasons stated 
above. The discovery of the suspected evidence was made during 
a legal search of this vehicle. 
Based upon the above, defendant's Motion to Suppress '/.the 
evidence taken during the inventory search is denied. 
Dated this/^W day of March, 1990. 
fA*™**/WL 
WARD H. RUSSON 
[STRICT COURT JUDGE \ 
rxnnn'? 
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Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI 
IN AND FOR STATE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
,". I 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 901900313FS 
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
The defendant, MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, by and through his 
attorney of record, JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby moves the Court to 
suppress all evidence taken from the defendant in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the following grounds: 
1) Search of the vehicle should have been conducted 
pursuant search warrant. 
2) No probable cause to stop. 
3) There was a pretext stop and subsequent to arrest there 
was no crime in the presence of the officer for which 
defendant should of been arrested. 
DATED this day of March, 1990. 
torney for Defendant 
/-xrfv^  
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The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns 
After Never Leaving 
JOHN M. BURKOFF* 
DEDICATION 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of G. Mennen Williams. 
I was Justice Williams' law clerk from 1973 to 1975. Not only 
did I come to admire and to respect him, but my wife, Nancy, and I 
grew to love him. Justice Williams and his wife, Nancy, treated us 
like family. 
I arrived for my clerkship in May of 1973. Like many, if not 
most, newly-minted Michigan Law School graduates, I was cocky, 
self-satisfied, and smug. I thought I knew it all. How quickly I 
learned otherwise. If for that alone, I had Justice Williams to thank 
for my brief (if evanescent) exposure to humility. 
But he truly taught me so much more. He taught me about law 
and lawyers (and life) in a way that cold reported decisions, musty 
casebooks, and my Michigan Law School professors did not—and 
could not. Justice Williams taught me by example. He neither lec-
tured nor hectored me. He showed me. He snowed me patience. 
He showed me how to exercise the public trust responsibly. He 
showed me tolerance. He showed me love. He showed me how not 
to become distracted from the constant struggle to search for the 
truth in the law. 
This Article is about truth. It is about the importance of recog-
nizing that constitutional doctrine must be crafted in such a way that 
it beatifies the truth, rather than ignoring it for short-term, result-
oriented reasons, however instantly appealing. It will come as no 
surprise to those who knew us both, that as close as Justice Williams 
and I became, we did not agree on everything. (Sometimes, he was 
wrong.) But I know that, whether or not he would have agreed with 
my conclusions in this Article— and we would have had some lively 
discussions about those conclusions—he would have encouraged 
and applauded my attempt to preserve the truth. 
Rest in peace, Governor. We miss you. 
* Professor of Law, University c^ Pittsburgh. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973, Univer-
sity of Michigan; LL.M. 1976, Harvard University. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Barbara Moravitz, Class of 1989. 
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Oh, what a (angled web we weave, 
When first we practice to deceive!** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice (then-Justice) Rehnquist once candidly observed 
that "the decisions of this Court dealing with the constitutionality of 
warrantless searches . . . suggest that this branch of the law is some-
thing less than a seamless web."1 There are, however, few fourth 
amendment webs less seamless—more tangled—than the decisional 
law and underlying doctrine relating to pretextual fourth amend-
ment activity. 
By "pretextual fourth amendment activity," I am referring to 
searches or seizures (including arrests) that are undertaken by law 
enforcement officers for reasons that do not constitute a proper 
legal justification for such activity.2 Such conduct is commonly 
called a "pretext," a "sham," or a "subterfuge," but the common 
thread is that it can be established that it was undertaken for illegiti-
mate reasons. Although it might seem to the reader who is first en-
countering this branch of the law a bit strange, if not wholly 
perverse, to be informed that some commentators and judges con-
sider such unjustified (by definition) fourth amendment activity to 
be nonetheless constitutional under the fourth amendment, that is 
indeed the case.3 Under this view of fourth amendment pretext 
doctrine, no cognizable constitutional problem exists when the 
problematic activity of law enforcement officers can be described as 
if it was within the boundaries of the law, although it can otherwise 
be conclusively demonstrated that such a rationalized justification is 
a fiction, i.e., that it does not in fact reflect the officers' true reasons 
for so acting. 
This author most assuredly does not share the point of view that 
the Constitution, current fourth amendment cases, or fourth 
amendment doctrine countenance or command legitimizing such a 
fiction.4 Most federal and state court judges, 'likewise, do not share 
the point of view that pretexts are constitutionally irrelevant.5 
** Scott, Marnnon, introduction, canto VI, stanza 17 (1808). 
"I will not practice to deceive,/ Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn." Shake-
speare, King John, act I, sc. 1, lines 214-15. 
1. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). 
2. See BurkofT. Bad Faith Searches, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 71 n.5, 101 n.160 
(1982) [hereinafter Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches]. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 62-85, 102, 121. Since such commenta-
tors and judges have found the activity so described not to be constitutionally ob-
jectionable, they have accordingly found such cases to be inappropriate for 
application of the exclusionary rule. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
5. See infra note 56 and text accompanying note 124. 
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The Supreme Court had a golden opportunity during its 1986-
1987 Term to make clear what its position actually is with respect to 
the constitutionality of pretexts. Questions relating to the appropri-
ate constitutional significance of fourth amendment pretextual activ-
ity were squarely before the Court in the case of Missouri v. Blair.6 
Certiorari was granted, briefs were filed, oral argument was heard; 
months passed while the parties waited for the Court's decision and, 
uliimately, the Court decided not to decide; it dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted without a single word of 
explanation. 
It is truly unfortunate that the Blair case was not decided by the 
Supreme Court. The facts in Blair posed pretext conundra in a 
clear-cut fashion.7 Nonetheless, the argument in Blair may well have 
had a significant effect on the Court. In four other important cases 
decided after Blair was argued to the Court, the Supreme Court 
handed down decisions where fourth amendment doctrine relating 
to pretextual activity was also applied or discussed.8 These four 
cases—cases which reflect the Court's views on all of the important 
legal points relating to pretexts that were argued but not decided in 
Blair—make clear what has all too often not been clear to some 
judges and commentators during the past decade, namely that: 
(1) the Supreme Court recognizes that a rinding of unconstitutional-
ity is compelled where evidence is seized on the basis of pretextual 
fourth amendment activity; (2) the Supreme Court recognizes that 
pretexts exist when law enforcement officers actually act pretextu-
ally even when they could have acted lawfully (but in fact did not); 
and, (3) the Supreme Court recognizes that the improper motiva-
tion of searching or arresting law enforcement officers—their "bad 
faith" or the absence thereof—is relevant to fourth amendment pre-
text analysis. 
This Article expands upon these points. It also makes the case 
for the continuing recognition and application of a vital, nonfictive 
pretext search doctrine. This approach to fourth amendment deci-
sion-making will **insure[] that every time a defendant can demon-
strate a pretext search or arrest, a court will deal with the pretextual 
activity under the law, and not simply ignore it."9 
6. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert, granted sub nom. 
Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987). 
7. For a discussion of the Blair case, see infra text accompanying notes 86-143. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 144-204. 
9. Burkoff, Rejoinder: Truth, Justice, and the American Way—Or Professor Haddad's 
Hard Choices; 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 695, 703 (1985) [hereinafter Burkoff, Rejoinder] 
(footnote omitted). 
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II. THE PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE CONTROVERSY 
A. Scott and Its Progeny 
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided what has, however inap-
propriately, become the seminal case on pretexts: Scott v. United 
States.10 In Scott, then-Justice Rehnquist offhandedly observed for a 
majority of the Court that the issue whether a fourth amendment 
violation exists in a given case of questioned law enforcement search 
or seizure activity should be resolved exclusively by using, in his 
words, "a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to 
the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved."11 Such 
an objective test is appropriate, Rehnquist opined, because "the fact 
that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothe-
cated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of-
ficer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."12 
Justice Rehnquist did not explain why this remarkable proposi-
tion—that law enforcement officers' intent or motivation is irrele-
vant—should be the case or why application of such an "objective" 
test was deemed to be compelled, necessary, or even desirable, as a 
test for fourth amendment analysis. The Scott "objective" test lan-
guage simply appeared as if deus ex machina. Indeed, i* is questiona-
ble, to put it mildly, whether the handful of prior Supreme Court 
decisions expressly relied upon by Justice Rehnquist to support his 
application of an "objective test" actually stood for the supportive 
propositions for which they were cited as precedential authority.13 
As Professor Wayne LaFave commented in analyzing this authority, 
"Justice Rehnquist is certainly correct in stating [in Scott] that the 
Court has 'not examined this exact question at great length in any of 
our prior opinions,' but it may nonetheless be fairly said that he has 
presented a somewhat skewed picture of what the Court had had to 
say on this subject."14 Just as important, Rehnquist failed to men-
tion, let alone discuss, any of a number of prior Supreme Court 
opinions that had treated law enforcement officers' improper mo-
tives for engaging in search or seizure activity as not only relevant 
but, in some cases, dispositive of the question of the conduct's 
fourth amendment constitutionality.15 
10. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
11. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted). 
12. Id. 
13. For criticism of Justice Rehnquist's use of this precedent, see BurkofF, Bad 
Faith Seatches, supta note 2, at 75-76 n 22. 
14. W. I.XFAVF. SFAKC.II AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 1.4(a), at 82 (2d cd 1987). 
15. See. eg , South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 V.S. 364, 376 (1976); Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 VS. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Wainwrighi v. Cit> of 
New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606-07* (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Abel v. 
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Nonetheless, whatever the legitimacy of its parentage, there is 
no denying the fact that the Supreme Court ruled in Scott that analy-
sis of fourth amendment issues should be conducted "objectively." 
The question then arises: what does this mean with respect to pre-
texts? If, indeed, the constitutionality of all fourth amendment ac-
tivity must be evaluated exclusively "objectively," i.e., in the Scott 
Court's words, "without regard to the underlying intent or motiva-
tion of the officers involved," it is problematic whether pretextual 
fourth amendment activity can ever be proved. How do you demon-
strate a "pretext" "objectively?" More to the point, the question 
arises whether such pretexts are indeed unconstitutional in any 
event.H> From this perspective, the putative use of an objective test 
lor fourth amendment analysis and the law relating to pretexts are 
directly and inextricably related. As I have elaborated upon else-
where,17 if evidence of a searching or arresting officer's pretextual 
motives is treated as irrelevant and, hence, inadmissible at suppres-
sion hearings (when it is otherwise available), it will be almost im-
possible to prove the officer's lack of lawful justification to search or 
arrest where, as is common, "the state is able to contrive an appro-
priate legal justification to account for the appearance (but not the 
reality) of a questioned search."18 
It is possible to avoid reaching this unhappy (to me) conclusion 
by recognizing that the Scott Court simply did not—or at least did 
not mean to—apply its supposed objective test to the issue of 
pretextual fourth amendment activity. After all, the objective test 
language in Scott was obiter dictum. The Scott case focused upon the 
constitutionality of the conduct of FBI agents who monitored a 
court-approved wiretap. The authorizing court order relied upon 
by the agents specifically required that the interception of conversa-
tions be "minimized" so as to include only those conversations law-
t'nited States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 
500 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 
(1932). See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978). See the 
discussion of these cases in Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 75-81; W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 1.4. 
16. For the position that they are not unconstitutional, see Haddad, Pretextual 
Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 639 (1985). See 
infra text accompanying notes 62-85 for a discussion of Haddad's position. 
17. See BurkofF, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Xow You See It. Sow You Don't, 17 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 523, 525-26 (1984) [hereinafter Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine)', 
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 81-82; Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the 
Fourth Amendment- The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 
151, 190 (1979) [hereinafter Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine). 
18. Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 548. 
19. I have argued just this point. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 
83-84,98-100. 
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fully subject to interception under the federal wiretap statute* 
The FBI agents did not, however, use any selectivity in their inter 
ception of conversations; instead, they simply recorded every single 
call made over the subject telephone during the interception period 
including personal calls, calls concerning employment opportuni-
ties, and calls to the weather service.21 
Defendant Scott claimed that this absence of minimization \va* 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the consti-
tutionality of this activity despite the absence of apparent minimiza 
tion because the agents never reached the point where it wa> 
necessary to minimize their interception of calls: 
In a case such as this, involving a wide-ranging conspiracy 
with a large number of participants, even a seasoned lis-
tener would have been hard pressed to determine with any 
precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they 
were completed. A large number were ambiguous in na-
ture, making characterization virtually impossible until the 
completion of these calls. And some of the nonpertinent 
conversations were one-time conversations. Since these calls 
did not give the agents an opportunity to develop a category of inno-
cent calls which should not have been intercepted, their interception 
cannot be viewed as a violation of the minimization requirements.22 
In essence, the FBI agents in Scott never had the opportunity to 
act upon their arguable intent to act in bad faith—to ignore the min-
imization requirement—since none of the calls actually intercepted 
were 44non-interceptible" under the Supreme Court's reading of the 
law. Hence, the language in Scott about "objective reasonableness" 
and "underlying intent or motivation" is simply unnecessary to the 
decision. The Scott Court "merely held that improper intent that n 
not acted upon does not render unconstitutional an otherwise consti-
tutional search. Since in pretext cases the searching officer has b\ 
definition acted on his unlawful intent, this reading of Scott harmo-
nizes the case with the Court's continuing concern about 
pretexts."2* 
20. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978). 
21. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 247 (D.D.C. 1971). "(Tjhe moni-
toring agents made no attempt to comply with the minimization order of the Court 
but listened to and recorded all calls over the [subject 1 telephone. They showed no 
regard for the right of privacv and did nothing to avoid unnecessary intrusion." 
Scott v. United States, Nos. 74-2097. 74-2098 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974) quoted in Scott 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 144 (1978) (Brennan.J., dissenting) (bracketed ma-
terial in original). 
22. 436 V.S. at 142 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
23. Buikoll, Had Faith Search**, supra note 2, at 83-84 (footnotes omitted, em-
phasis added). Sec also Buikoff, Pretext Seanh Doctrine, supra note 17, at 525-27; Note, 
Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Motivation m Establishing Fourth 
Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 241 (1983). 
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As convenient as this obiter dictum conclusion is for those of us 
who would like to reconcile the Scott objective test language with 
prior (and subsequent) Supreme Court decisional law stating or im-
plying that pretextual searches and arrests are unconstitutional,24 
the Supreme Court subsequently applied Scott as if it were not obiter 
dictum in its 1983 decision in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.25 
The Villamonte-Marquez case involved the suspicionless boarding of a 
vessel, the Henry Morgan II, by customs officers. Then-Justice Rehn-
quist, the author of the Scott majority opinion, concluded for the ma-
jority in Villamonte-Marquez that such random, suspicionless stops 
and boardings of vessels "with ready access to the open sea" are 
constitutional despite the absence of particularized antecedent justi-
fication, at least when they are made by federal agents armed with 
the statutory authority to enforce federal vessel documentation 
laws.*6 The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez, all of whom were ulti-
mately convicted of various narcotics offenses after the boarding of-
ficers discovered marijuana aboard the Henry Morgan II', argued that 
the search of their ship was pretextual, and that it was not in fact 
made to enforce the vessel documentation laws whose existence 
gave rise to the legal and constitutional authority to search without 
any antecedent justification. Rather, defendants flatly contended, 
"[t]he Henry Morgan II was boarded by the officers of a law enforce-
ment patrol formed for the specific criminal investigatory purpose 
of locating boats loaded with marijuana/*-'7 
There was, moreover, a good deal of evidence on the record 
before the Supreme Court establishing that defendants' pretext ar-
gument had some merit to it. Not the least of the evidence mar-
shalled by defendants was the fact that a state police narcotics 
investigator who boarded the Henry Morgan II with the federal cus-
toms agents conceded the truth of defendants' claim, that the officers 
were boarding all of the ships at anchor in the ship channel looking 
for narcotics 2H Justice Rehnquist was not, however, interested in the 
merit—or lack thereof—of this contention. Rather, he summarily 
rejected the pretext argument itself as untenable, ruling in a cursory 
footnote that: 
Respondents . . . contend . . . that because the customs of-
24. See, e.g., United Slates v. ^eflcowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1921) ("An arrest 
may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."); cases cited in supra note 14 
and infra notes 144-204. 
25. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
26. I criticized this conclusion as a matter of fourth amendment doctrine with-
out regard to the pretext issue in BurkoiF, When Is A Search Xot A 'Search?' Fourth 
Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. Toi.. L. RF.V. 515, 541-46 (1984). 
27. Brief for the Respondents at 6, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 
U.S. 579 (1983). 
28. Id. at 9. See also Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 530-32. 
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ficers were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, 
and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the 
ship channel was thought to be carrying marijuana, they 
may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for in-
spection of the vessel's documentation. This line of rea-
soning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v. United 
States . . ., and we again reject it.29 
In other words, a majority of the Villamonte-Marquez Court held 
that because the Scott decision dictated the use of an objective test to 
gauge the validity of fourth amendment activity, the admittedly un-
lawful30 (subjective) motive of the boarding officers in Villamonte-
Marquez to undertake a pretextual search was simply irrelevant to 
the constitutional analysis because a document search of the vessel 
could have lawfully been made under federal regulations. Applied in 
this manner, the Scott language made it totally impossible for the 
Villamonte-Marquez defendants to present a cognizable case of pre-
text, as the true reasons the vessel search was undertaken were 
treated as wholly irrelevant—the truth was less important to the 
Court than the fictive objective appearance of the activity as it could 
have been interpreted when viewed in the most charitable, if inaccu-
rate, possible light.31 
Professor LaFave has noted that the Supreme^Court has also 
relied upon Scott in one case besides Villamonte-Marquez?2 the 1985 
decision of Maryland v. Macon?* This is nominally true since the 
Scott decision was cited in Macon, but Macon is not a case that deals 
with pretext issues. In Macon, the Supreme Court ruled that a plain-
clothes, undercover detective who purchased two obscene 
magazines with a marked fifty dollar bill, left the store and then im-
mediately returned to retrieve the bill (without, it might be pointed 
out for the record, returning the change for the fifty dollars he had 
previously received) was not subject to any fourth amendment re-
strictions on 'his conduct* as he had not "seized" the magazines 
within the meaning of the term "seizure" in the fourth amendment. 
The reason there was no "seizure," Justice O'Connor stated for the 
29. 462 U.S. at 584 n.3 (citation omitted). 
30 Normally, fourth amendment activity must be supported by probable 
cause. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). Hence, a search for mari-
juana ordinarily would require the existence of probable cause which, as the 
Supreme Court acknowledged, did not exist in the Villamonte-Marquez case. The 
parties further agreed that not even the lesser antecedent justification of "reason-
able suspicion" existed as justification for the search of the Henry Morgan II. 
31. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist ignored even the questionable objective appear-
ance of this activiiv. I he record was replete with objective evidence of pretext, 
wholly aside from the Louisiana state policeman's subjective concession of pretext. 
See BuikoH, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 530-32. 
32. YV 1-AFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4, at 81 n.2. 
33. 472 U.S. 463 (1985). 
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majority, was that the seller had "voluntarily transferred any posses-
sory interest he may have had in the magazines to the purchaser 
upon the receipt of the funds."34 Defendant Macon argued, how-
ever, that this transfer of funds was not what it appeared to be, i.e., it 
was not really a bona fide commercial transaction. The undercover 
agent clearly neither intended—nor permitted—the buyer to keep 
the fifty dollars he had tendered; hence, defendant urged, the 
agent's act of obtaining the magazines at issue should be treated not 
as a purchase, but as an involuntary "seizure" that must be justified 
under the fourth amendment.35 The Macon majority disagreed with 
this contention, ruling in response that: 
This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. Whether a 
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred "turns on an 
objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,'* Scott 
v. United States, . . . and not on the officer's actual state of 
mind at the time the challenged action was taken. . . . Ob-
jectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in the ordinary 
course of business. The sale is not retrospectively trans-
formed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's 
subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as 
evidence.36 
As in Villamonte-Marquez, the Scott language was used by the Ma-
con Court to render the true reasons why the conduct in question 
took place (criminal investigation not ordinary commercial 
34. Id. at 469. 
35. Brief for the Respondent at 10-11, Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 
(1985). Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union made the argument most 
clearly: 
As no appreciable time had lapsed between the officer's "purchase'* of the 
magazines and his recapture of the money, it borders on sophistry to as-
sert, as [the state of Maryland] does . . . that once [Defendant], on his 
employer's behalf, had voluntarily surrendered possession of the 
magazines in exchange for their purchase price, he had relinquished all 
interest in the merchandise, retaining an interest only in the money. 
Hypertechnical applications of principles of property law may not be used 
to defeat close scrutiny of police conduct in obtaining evidence. 
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union at 6 (citations omitted), 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985). Defendant was attempting to establish 
this point in order to be able to make the further argument that since this transac-
tion was indeed a "seizure," the law enforcement officer needed a warrant to make 
it. 
36. Macon, 472 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor added, how-
ever, that the recapture of the $50 bill may well have been an unconstitutional 
seizure. Nonetheless, she stated that "[assuming, arguendo, that the retrieval of the 
money incident to the arrest was wrongful, the proper remedy is restitution or sup-
pression of the $50 bill as evidence of the purchase, not exclusion from evidence of 
ihe previously purchased magazines." Id. 
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purchase) irrelevant. That is not to say, however, unlike in Yi> 
lamonte-Marquez, that if the true reason for the acquisition of the 
magazines in Macon was considered (they were actually "seized" as 
part of a criminal investigation), rather than the operative "fiction" 
that was used (this was simply an ordinary commercial transaction), 
the seizure was pretextual or otherwise unconstitutional. Rather, if 
the Court had assessed this transaction on the basis of the actual 
facts, objective and subjective, it would have been forced to address 
the then-dispositive issue whether a warrantless "seizure" of ob-
scene materials in this fashion was justified in these circumstances. 
If it was, there was no pretext. Hence, the application of the Scott 
language in Macon, unlike the application of Scott in Villamonte-Mai-
quez, does no damage to the concern for the deterrence of pretextual 
fourth amendment activity since the undercover officer in Macon was 
not necessarily acting for improper reasons.37 
Accordingly, the only Supreme Court decision that truly threat-
ens the proposition that pretextual fourth amendment activity is in-
appropriate and unconstitutional is Villamonte-Marquez. But, 
although the Court has not applied the Scott objective test language 
directly in any case other than Villamonte-Marquez, Villamonte-Marqua 
is, nonetheless, not the Court's last, only, or most important word 
on this subject.38 
B. Pretext Commentary 
L My Position 
In a number of articles published since the Scott decision was 
handed down,3" I have, in Professor LaFave's words, "sounded the 
alarm,*'40 trying to make two basic and independent points about 
that decision's supposed adoption of an "objective" fourth amend-
ment lest and the impact of such a test upon the proof—and rele-
vance—of pretextual search and seizure activity. First, I have 
argued that Supreme Court decisions handed down before and after 
the Scott decision have neither uniformly adopted nor applied an ob-
jective fourth amendment test as was seemingly dictated in Scott, de-
spite the fact that the isolated opinion of Villamonte-Marquez^ 
states—or implies—the contrary. That is simply to say that the case 
law is decidedly ambiguous and inconsistent on this subject. In-
37. See supra-iexi accompanying note 2. 
38. See infra text accompanying notes 144-207. 
39. Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 17, at 181-90; Burkoff, 
Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1982); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 
supra note 2; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra 
note 9. 
40. See VV. U F . W E , supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 83. 
41. For a discussion of United Stales v. Villamonte-Marquez, see supra text ac-
compaming notes 25-31. 
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deed, a number of Supreme Court decisions have been handed 
down since Scott—and continue to come down—which, unlike Scottt 
clearly apply fourth amendment doctrine in ways that are far from 
objective, treating the subjective motives of law enforcement of-
ficers engaged in searches and seizures as important, if not disposi-
tive, constitutional considerations, particularly as they relate to 
claims of pretextual activity.42 
Second, I have also argued that, assuming that pretexts are un-
constitutional, the availability of an inquiry into the motives of 
searching or arresting law enforcement officers is not only desirable, 
but critically necessary in order to insure that law enforcement of-
ficers generally will be deterred, through the application of the ex-
clusionary rule, from engaging in pretextual fourth amendment 
activity. By advocating the continued use of such a subjective "bad-
faith" test,43 it is important to point out that I do not urge its use as 
a replacement for an objective test. To the contrary, I firmly believe 
that its most beneficial—even necessary—use is exactly as it is being 
used today in most state courts across the country44—as a vital sup-
plement to the objective test.45 
2. Professor LaFave s Position 
Professor LaFave has responded to these arguments by agree-
ing with me that given the facts in Scott set forth in the lower court 
opinion and the prior decisions which were not discussed in the ma-
jority opinion, the Scott decision "can hardly be read as a definitive 
analysis settling that in all circumstances fourth amendment sup-
pression issues are to be resolved without assaying 4the underlying 
intent or motivation of the officers involved.' "46 LaFave nonethe-
less argues that such a reading of Scott, although not legally com-
pelled, "is precisely what the rule ought to be."47 The reason that 
42. See infra text accompanying notes 144-204. 
43. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2. But see VV. LAFAVE, supra note 
14, § 1.4, at 80 (calling the phrase "bad faith" a somewhat inaccurate characteriza-
tion, but nonetheless using it as the title of the appropriate subsection of his 
treatise). 
44. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
45. The protocol for assessing fourth amendment pretexts should be as 
follows: 
Initially, a court should determine whether a search is objectively constitu-
tional or unconstitutional. If the search is objectively unconstitutional, a 
court need proceed no further. If, however, the search is objectively con-
stitutional, the court must next determine (if the issue is raised) whether 
the search was a "bad faith" search. 
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 116. See also Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 
9, at 696, 703. 
46. VV. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 83 (emphasis original). 
47. Id. 
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such an objective approach is the appropriate analysis in pretext 
cases, LaFave contends, is that 
the proper basis of concern is not with why the officer devi-
ated from the usual practice in this case but simply that he 
did deviate. It is the fact of the departure from the accepted 
way of handling such cases which makes the officer's con-
duct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this con-
text constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation.48 
Moreover, LaFave argues that "[underlying the Scott rule . . . is the 
sound notion . . . that 'sending state and federal courts on an expe-
dition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and 
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.' "4f) 
However, LaFave's analysis does not, unlike the Supreme Court 
in Villamonte-Marquez, treat fourth amendment pretextual activity as 
constitutionally irrelevant. Far from it. Rather, LaFave's point is 
that pretexts are unconstitutional, but that the existence of such un-
constitutional pretextual activity should be assessed (exclusively) 
objectively. Accordingly, to assess constitutionality in a case of 
questionable conduct, LaFave has proposed that the question that 
should be asked and answered by the appropriate court is whether 
"the Fourth Amendment activity 'was carried out in accordance with 
standard procedures in the local police department.' "50 
I have criticized LaFave's analysis on this point at length else-
where.51 Suffice it to say that I agree that the use of LaFave's objec-
tive approach is a sensible first step to take in determining whether 
law enforcement officers have committed a fourth amendment viola-
tion.52 What is difficult to understand is why such an objective ap-
proach should also be the final—and exclusive—step in a pretext 
analysis. ' » 
The argument that subjective inquiries into law enforcement of-
ficers' motives are difficult or fruitless53 totally begs the question 
whether they are nonetheless constitutionally appropriate or even 
necessary.54 Indeed, as Professor James Haddad pointed out, "The 
48. Id.. § 1.4(c), at 94 (emphasis in original). 
49. Id. at 96 (quoting Massachusetts v. Painien, 389 VS. 560, 565 (1968) 
(White, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted)). 
50. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976) (em-
phasis original)). 
51. BurkofF, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 107-11. See also Haddad, supra 
note 16, at 650-51. 
52. See supra note 45 and text accompanying notes 43-45. 
53. See supra text accompanying note 49; W. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(e), at 
96 ("there is no reason to believe that courts can with any degree of success deter-
mine in which instances the police had an ulterior motive."); Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 436-37 (1974). 
54. "If justice requires [aj fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no 
ground for refusing to try." O.VV. HOLMES, THE COMMON L\W 48 (1881). 
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worst that one could say [about a subjective inquiry] is that under 
such an approach, because of the difficulty of proof, the prosecution 
would sometimes benefit from evidence discovered through pretex-
tual fourth amendment activity."55 How different is this difficulty of 
proof from the difficulty the defense ordinarily has on every sup-
pression motion? Moreover, the fruitlessness argument is simply, 
soundly, and empirically disproved by the scores of federal and state 
court decisions in which such motivational evidence has been found 
to be readily available (and, accordingly, where a finding of pretext 
has been treated as dispositive of the constitutionality of the 
search).5" 
55. Haddad, supra note 16, at 685. Haddad adds: 
The typical criticism of Professor Burkoff's approach is quite unsophistica-
ted. Ignoring the many areas of constitutional law analysis where the 
Court has assigned motive a role, or where the Court has denied it a role 
only after extensive discussion, the critics often dismiss, in a sentence or 
two, the [subjective] methodology of resolving pretextual fourth amend-
ment claims. . . . But if constitutional law sometimes makes motive deter-
minative of outcome—even in contexts where the search for motive is 
more difficult than in the pretextual search context—difficulty of ascertain-
ment cannot suffice to defeat the use of motive in pretextual search 
analysis. 
Id. at 681-82 (footnotes omitted). 
56. See, e.g.. United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (cita-
tions omitted) ("Whether an arrest is a mere pretext to search turns on the motiva-
tion or primary purpose of the arresting officers. . . . Courts have found improper 
moiivation where the defendant is arrested for a minor offense so as to allow police 
to search for evidence of some other unrelated offense for which police lack prob-
able cause to arrest or search."). 
For some of the many recently reported decisions suppressing evidence based 
upon a finding of pretext, see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (1 1th Cir. 
1987); United Slates v. Merchant, 760 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1985), cert, granted, 478 
U.S. 1003 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 615 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 722 
K.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Prim. 698 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1983); 
t'niied States v. Ospina, 618 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Mil-
lio, 588 F. Supp. 45 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); United Slates v. Abbott, 584 F. Supp. 442 
(W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 749 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Belcher, 577 F. Supp. 
1241 (E.D. Va. 1983); United Stales v. Nelson, 511 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Tex. 1980); 
t'niied States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. III. 1980); United States v. Sanford, 
493 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1980); Spann v. State. 494 So. 2d 716 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 494 So. 2d 719 (Ala. 1986); Guzman v. State, 283 Ark. 
112, 672 S.W.2d 656 (1984); People v. Howard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 8, 208 Cal. Rptr. 
353 (1984); People v. Dickson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 192 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1983); 
People v. Albritton, 138 Cal. App. 3d 79, 187 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1982); People v. 
Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529 (Colo. 1983); State v. Miller, 420 A.2d 181 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1980); Nealy v. State, 400 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 
419 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1982); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, 
tnt. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981); Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877 
(1980); State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 621 P.2d 370 (1980); People v. Reincke, 84 111. 
App. 3d 222, 405 N.E.2d 430 (1980); State v. Killcrease, 379 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980); 
Stale v. Harris, 504 So. 2d 156. (La. Ct. App. 1987); Smith v. Stale, 48 Md. App. 
425, 427 A.2d 1064 (1981); Manalansan v. Slate. 45 Md. App. 667. 415 A.2d 308 
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Furthermore, LaFave's argument that only the objective "fact" 
of a law enforcement officer's arbitrary deviation from the "usual 
practice" or "standard procedures" should be relevant to fourth 
amendment pretext analysis raises more problems than it resolves. 
Not only do a police department's usual practices or standard pro-
cedures (where they exist) have no constitutional status per se, they 
may indeed be unconstitutional.57 Nor is a concern about law en-
forcement arbitrariness the only doctrinal concern the Supreme 
Court must consider in fourth amendment cases. When a law en-
forcement officer acts pretextualiy, the Court must be equally or 
more concerned about the simple fact that it has failed to get the 
message across to the officer that he or she needed a lawful justifica-
tion for acting before fourth amendment activity could be under-
taken. In other words, not only has the law enforcement officer who 
acts pretextualiy acted arbitrarily,58 he or she has also acted (by defi-
nition) for reasons which he or she should have known do not justify 
such conduct. Such illegal conduct should—must—be deterred. 
The Supreme Court has made it crystal clear on many occasions 
(1980); People v. Siegel, 95 Mich. App. 594, 291 N.W.2d 134 (1980); State v. Blair. 
691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985), cert, granted, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 
V.S. 698 (1987); Stale v. Carlson, 198 Mont. 113, 644 P.2d 498 (1982); Hatley v. 
State, 100 New 214, 678 P.2d 1160 (1984); State v. Sidebotham, 124 N.H. 682,474 
A.2d 1377 (1984); People v. Pace, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d 
618 (1985); People v. Llopis, 125 A.D.2d 416, 509 N.Y^.2d 135, (N.Y. App. Div. 
1986); People v. Auletta, 88 A.D.2d 867, 452 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1982); People 
v.Castro, 125 Misc. 2d 15, 479 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1984); People v. Griffin, 116 
Misc. 2d 751, 456 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1982); State v. Hall, 52 N.C. App. 492. 
279S.E.2d Ml,cert.denied, 304 N.C. 198, 215 S.E.2d 104 (1981); Commonwealth v. 
Landamus. 333 Pa. Super. 382, 482 A.2d 619 (1984); Commonwealth v. Corbin. 
322 Pa. Super. 271, 469 A.2d 615 (1983); State v. Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d 173 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim App. 1987): 
King v. State, 733 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App. 1987); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 739 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1987) (en banc); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); McMillan 
v. State, 609 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1986); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1985); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983); Hart v. Common-
wealth, 221 Va. 283. 269 S.E.2d 806 (1980); State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 647 
P.2d 489 (1982); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); State v. 
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 
263, 616 P.2d 649 (1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981); Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 
1092 (Wyo. 1987). See also citations collected at Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra 
note 2, at 113 n.213. 
Some stale and federal courts have, ironically', adopted Professor LaFave's ra-
tionale for rejecting the use of a subjective pretext test, i.e. this type of analysis is 
fruitless, when pretextual fourth amendment activity was already established on the 
record! 
57. See BurkofT, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 107-11. 
58. Moreover, an arbitrary search (in the sense of one deviating from usual 
practices) may not be unconstitutional. See, e.g.. United Stales v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 
741, 755-57 (1979); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2. at 110. 
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in the recent past that its principal or only reason for applying an 
exclusionary rule to remedy fourth amendment violations is the 
general deterrence of police officers.59 Only the use of a subjective 
pretext test serves to deter those police officers who have no inten-
tion of following the law, but are nonetheless "savvy" enough to 
make their conduct appear (objectively) as if it is lawful. These are 
the police officers, for example, who stop cars or boats to look for 
narcotics and who later sit in court while a prosecutor argues a fic-
tion, namely that such stops were lawful because the stops were in 
fact regulatory, undertaken in order to enforce the traffic or regis-
tration, not narcotics, laws. Only 4i[t]he use of a subjective pretext 
analysis carries with it a simple and understandable, if not classic, 
general deterrent message: to search, you must act for the reasons 
that justify the search/'60 
An example I have used before may be useful to illustrate this 
point: 
We do not want to deter the searching police officer who 
honestly and forthrightly acts to search for drugs on the 
basis of his recognition of the odor of marijuana. We do, 
however, want to deter the searching police officer who 
searches for wholly improper reasons using a search for 
drugs as a pretext. Since the objective conduct and circum-
stances might well appear exactly the same in both cases, 
the only way to assess accurately when an improper search 
has occurred and thus the only way to deter police officers 
from engaging in such improper activities is to focus on the 
searching officer's subjective intent. Such a subjective fo-
cus to exclusionary doctrine should serve to "instruct" the 
police generally that such an improper intent is just that— 
improper—and will accordingly, result in rendering a 
search unconstitutional no matter how pristine it might 
otherwise objectively, fortuitously appear.61 
3. Professor Haddad s Position 
Professor James Haddad takes a completely different approach 
to the subject of pretexts.62 He argues, contrary to my and to Pro-
fessbr LaFave's position, that there is absolutely no ambiguity in 
Supreme Court decisions relating to pretextual fourth amendment 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 
(1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
rrh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 404 U.S. 338 (1974). 
60. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 702. 
61. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 111-12. 
62. See generally Haddad, supra note 16; Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptiom, Claims 
of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. 8C CRIMINOLOGY 198, 204-14 
(1977). 
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activity. Rather, Haddad claims that what he calls "the hard-choia 
approach . . . is the only approach to the pretext problem that tht 
Supreme Court has used consistently/'63 By the "hard-choice aj> 
proach," Haddad is referring to his theory that 
the Supreme Court has consistently taken into account the 
possibility of pretextual fourth amendment activity in de-
termining whether to expand a particular fourth amend-
ment limitation upon police conduct. Sometimes it has left 
police practices untouched, sometimes it has narrowed the 
scope of police practices; always it has considered govern-
mental and individual interests and not just pretext 
possibilities.04 
To clarify his point, Haddad contrasts his "hard-choice" ap-
proach to what he calls the "case-by-case" approach to pretexts 
wherein "courts examine pretext claims on a case-by-case basis, ex-
cluding the product of the fourth amendment activity if they find 
that officers exercised the [search or seizure] power pretextualiy."65 
In contrast to the case-by-case approach, Haddad argues that the 
Supreme Court should—and does—simply craft its fourth amend 
ment doctrine in the form of general rules, forged with the recogni-
tion that pretexts should be deterred thereby. Since, accordingly, 
pretexts are only to be considered by the Supreme Court in the craft-
ing of general rules, when a pretext is apparent on the facts of a 
particular case, lower courts must, Haddad counsels, grjf their teeth 
and simply ignore it.66 
Haddad further subdivides the case-by-case approach to pre-
texts into two sub-categories: my approach, described previously,67 
which he titles the "individual motivation" approach,68 and 
63. Haddad, supra note 16, at 653 (footnote omitted). 
64. Id. at 673. 
65. Id. at 649. 
66. This is no overstatement. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 16, at 692: 
After courts have reexamined various fourth amendment rules under 
the hard-choice approach, eliminating some, narrowing some, and leaving 
some unmodified, possibilities for pretextual use will remain. Courts have 
eliminated roving patrol license check stops, for example. They could 
limit the power to enter a suspect's home under the authority of a dated 
warrant. But we know that they will not prevent the police from stopping 
speeding motorists. Because this is so, under the hard-choice approach the po-
lice will always have an opportunity to stop speeding motorists in the hope of observing 
evidence of a robbery in plain view. The hard-choice approach says 'so be it. " 
Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
68. Haddad, supra note 16, at 681 passim. Professor Haddad concedes, as he 
must, that this approach is not just mine, indeed that "(mjany lower courts have 
adopted this motivation approach." Id. at 649 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 693 
("1 must acknowledge that hundreds of opinions from other courts agree with [Pro-
fessor Burkofr.s] basic approach."). 
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LaFave's approach,69 which ignominiously untitled, Haddad accu-
rately describes as focusing upon "whether the police departed 
from standard procedures."70 Professor Haddad generously con-
tributes to my continuing legal education by spending fifty-four 
pages dissecting, explaining, and criticizing my approach,71 but sim-
ply dismisses LaFave's approach out-of-hand, in his words, "because 
1 am not sure how it would operate/*72 
I have very briefly responded to Professor Haddad's criticisms 
elsewhere.73 I think he was wrong in 1985 when he argued that no 
prior Supreme Court decision had ever recognized the existence of 
a pretext search doctrine, or at least a doctrine which could be ap-
plied in individual cases.74 More important, whatever the true im-
port of Supreme Court precedents, I thought then and think now 
that he is dead wrong when he argues that use of my subjective pre-
text analysis is inappropriate as a matter of sensible fourth amend-
ment policy. Haddad summarized his complaints about my 
approach as follows: 
The individual motivation methodology punishes the pros-
ecution where an officer has acted within the letter of the 
law to further the laudable goal of obtaining incriminating 
evidence. More importantly, an individual motivation 
methodology shifts the focus away from the most impor-
tant issues: the existence and scope of fourth amendment 
limitations. Unlike the hard-choice approach, it tends to 
inhibit critical reassessment and deserved expansion of 
fourth amendment limitations.75 
I have three problems with this analysis. First, a law enforce-
ment officer who is acting pretextualiy simply is not acting "within 
the letter of the law,"76 a point that Haddad ultimately is moved to 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 46-61. 
70. Haddad, supra note 16, at 650 (footnote omitted). As noted previously, 
because LaFave feels that the Scott decision provides the language, if not the analy-
sis, which underlies his approach, it is typically referred to as the "objective" analy-
sis in contrast to my "subjective" analysis. 
71. Haddad, supra note 16. (Authorial aside: I am teasing, of course, Jim, and 
appreciate the many kind comments you also had to offer about my work.) 
72. Id. at 650 (footnote omitted). Haddad does, however, seemingly associate 
himself with my criticisms of LaFave's approach. See id. at 650 n.43, 675-76, 681-
85. 
73. See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9. Professor LaFave has merely consigned 
Haddad to citation in a footnote. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 81 n.3. 
74. See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 695-99. 
75. Haddad, supra note 16, at 681. 
76. For example, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the 
Supreme Court held constitutional suspicionless automobile inventory searches 
that are not "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." Id. at 376. 
Hence, if a law enforcement officer undertakes an automobile inventory search as a 
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concede.77 Second, unless we are to stand the Constitution on its 
head, it is obviously not "laudable" for a law enforcement officer to 
attempt to obtain incriminating evidence by pretextual, i.e., constitu-
tionally unjustified, means. To hold otherwise is essentially to argue 
that the Bill of Rights and interpretive judicial decisions need not be 
followed because good ends justify bad (unconstitutional) means.78 
Nor are all police investigatory ends good ones. Treating pretexts 
as if they were "laudable" would often serve to "cover up" discrimi-
natory police activity.79 
Finally, Haddad's criticisms of the subjective approach to pre-
texts are off base. Haddad essentially compares and contrasts all of 
his approach and only part of mine, neglecting the fact that my sub-
jective approach is designed—and has often been used80—not to 
supplant his desired "hard-choice" reassessment of fourth amend-
ment doctrine, but rather to supplement it.KI In fairness, Haddad 
does ultimately acknowledge that "[o]f course, the Court could still 
reexamine various fourth amendment doctrines while simultane-
ously retaining an individual motivation approach."82 He nonethe-
less ultimately dismisses this possibility because, in his words: "I 
believe, however, that the availability of an individual motivation ap-
proach serves as a 'crutch.* It allows the Court to justify a particular 
police practice by declaring . . . that the Court will deal with abuses 
of the power on a case-by-case basis."83 
pretext concealing an investigatory motive, that clearly is not an ae\ undertaken 
"within the letter of the law." See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 699-700. 
77. As Haddad generously concludes his article, "Professor BurkoflF's articles 
have made me realize that to assert that . . . an improperly motivated officer acts 
within the boundaries of an established fourth amendment doctrine begs the ques-
tion." Haddad, supra note 16, at 693. 
78. "Law enforcement officers cannot break down doors without probable 
cause, rummage through homes indiscriminately, or arrest anyone they want with-
out sufficient justification at law—even if they are honestly looking for criminal evi-
dence in the process." Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 700. 
79. See, e.g.. People v. Castro, 125 Misc. 2d 15, 479 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (Sup. Ct. 
1984) ("it appears that members of the squad patrolling in minority neighborhoods 
may use the pretext of (investigating) possible taxi crime as an excuse for stopping 
gypsy cabs and searching the passengers with the hope of finding guns or other 
contraband"). 
80. See supra citations at note 56. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, and text accompanying note 52. 
82. Haddad. supra note 16, at 688. 
83. Id. at 688-89 (citations omitted). Haddad adds: "The more 'outrageous' 
the pretextual use of a power, the more likely a defense lawyer will argue pretext 
and will fail to argue that a court should narrow the underlying power." Id. at 689. 
It is difficult to understand why, however, the reasonably capable defense attorney 
would not—and should not be able to—make both arguments. Under Professor 
Haddad's analysis, only the latter argument would be available to defense counsel 
who, arguing at the suppression court level, would be unlikely (to put it mildly) to 
hinge his or her whole defense on attempting to convince a suppression court to 
establish a new constitutional rule. 
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This is an odd argument. If Haddad is arguing that the availa-
bility of such a case-by-case approach (mine or LaFave's) has in fact 
served as a "crutch" for the Supreme Court in the past, then he is 
effectively confessing error as to his earlier argument that Supreme 
Court precedent reveals the prior, unequivocal rejection of that ap-
proach.84 If Haddad is arguing instead that the adoption of such a 
tase-by-case approach would serve as a "crutch" if and when it is ever 
used, it is difficult to imagine why that would—or should—be so. 
Since there is no dispute over the fact that the subjective proof of 
pretext can be exceedingly difficult for defense counsel to make, it is 
hard to imagine why the Supreme Court would rely on that unlikely 
possibility as a rationale for otherwise crafting the main body of its 
fourth amendment law so as to ignore the threat of pretextual activ-
ity altogether. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, "[t]he fact that 
pretexts are difficult for defense counsel to establish except in ex-
ceptional cases should give the Supreme Court additional incentive 
to make 'hard choices' as to the desirable scope of fourth amend-
ment powers as a generic matter. OD 
III. MISSOURI V. BL.UR 
The Supreme Court had before it during its 1986-1987 Term 
the ideal case in which to adopt, elucidate, or refine its position on 
the proper constitutional import of these pretext search issues. The 
case was Missouri v. Blair, in which certiorari was granted in January 
of 1986.86 The facts in Blair lent themselves to analysis in paradig-
matic fashion of all of the pretext issues discussed above. 
A. The Facts 
On November 24, 1981, Kansas City, Missouri police officers 
discovered the dead body of 59-year-old Carl Lindstedt in a park 
lagoon. Lindstedt had been bound hand and foot and shot. The 
only solid evidence found near the scene of the crime was a palm 
print discovered behind the passenger door on the victim's truck, 
which was discovered parked a quarter mile away from the body. 
The search for Lindstedt's killer got nowhere.87 
On January 22, 1982, two months after Lindstedt's body was 
found, an unknown tipster telephoned an investigator in the county 
prosecutor's office and reported that she had talked to some chil-
84. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
85. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 701 (footnote omitted). 
86. 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987). 
87. Facts are drawn from the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Blair, 
691 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Mo. 1985), from the unpublished Missouri Court of Appeals 
opinion, State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984), and from the 
Briefs of the parties to the Supreme Court. 
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dren who said that they had overheard members of the Blair famih 
bragging about their involvement in the murder. Based upon this 
double hearsay tip, palm prints on file of three of the Blair family 
members were examined by the police and were found not to match 
the print found at the scene of the crime. The police did not, how-
ever, have a palm print of the fourth Blair family member, Zola 
Blair, on file. So, on January 23, 1982, a Kansas City homicide 
detective issued a so-called "pick up" order to bring Zola Blair in to 
the stationhouse for questioning about the Lindstedt murder. The 
detective, according to the Missouri Supreme Court, summarizing 
the trial court's finding and testimony, "did not ask for a homicide 
arrest or search warrant because he believed there was not enough 
evidence to support a warrant.""8 
On February 5, 1982, Zola Blair was picked up by the Kansas 
City police. She was taken to the downtown homicide unit, booked 
for homicide, detained overnight in jail, interrogated, and her palm 
and finger prints were taken. After denying any knowledge of the 
murder during interrogation, she was released at 10:45 a.m. the 
next day. Three days later, however, Blair was arrested and booked 
once again for homicide—her palm print taken on February 5, 1982, 
had matched the one found at the scene of the crime. 
After Zola Blair's arrest, her attorney moved to suppress the 
palm print taken from his client after she was "picked up" by the 
Kansas City police as well as some incriminating statements she 
made after being confronted with the evidence cff the matching 
prints. His rationale for suppression was that the police lacked 
probable cause to "pick up" Zola Blair for homicide before they had 
matched her palm print, the "pick up" was therefore unconstitu-
tional, and the print and subsequent statements were, as a result, 
suppressive fruits of this unconstitutional act. 
This suppression argument was not difficult to win. The United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that, whatever the police 
call it, when you "pick up" someone, take them to the stationhouse 
and hold them for questioning, that's an "arrest" (a "seizure" in 
fourth amendment terminology).89 And to make an arrest, the po-
lice must have "probable cause" to believe that the arrestee commit-
ted a crime.90 
In Zola Blair's case, it is clear that the police did not have prob-
able cause with respect to her participation in the Lindstedt murder 
88. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Mo. 1985), cert, panted sub nom. Mis-
souri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 V.S. 698 (1987). 
89. See, e.g.. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) ("detention for 
custodial interrogation—regardless of" its label—intrudes so severely on interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safe-
guards against illegal arrest."). 
90. U.S. CONST, amend. IV. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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before they picked her up and took her palm print. They only had 
an unknown informant's uncorroborated, double hearsay tip that 
Zola Blair's family was bragging about the murder.91 This kind of 
unsupported accusation is not—and can never be—enough, by it-
self, to establish probable cause to arrest someone. If it were 
deemed to be enough, probable cause would become a meaningless 
requirement; anyone could arrange the arrest of a person he or she 
disliked simply by calling the nearest police station and anony-
mously accusing that person of committing a crime. Worse still, po-
lice officers would never have to uncover any real probable cause 
information in order to make an arrest because they could always 
use as justification the anonymous tip they (allegedly) received that 
implicated the arrestee. Indeed, in Zola Blair's case, after her attor-
ney made his motion to suppress the evidence against her, the pros-
ecution ultimately conceded that the informant's tip was not enough 
lo establish probable cause to arrest her—and the Missouri courts 
readily agreed with this conclusion.92 
Given this expurgated factual recitation, the Blair case, while 
troubling because it raises the possibility that someone who may 
have been at a murder scene may go untried for lack of admissible 
evidence, raises no original or sophisticated fourth amendment is-
sues. This would be true even if we knew (which we do not) that Zola 
Blair was actually involved in the Lindstedt murder. As Justice 
Scalia has recently acknowledged for the Supreme Court, "There is 
nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insu-
lates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us 
all/*93 
But, the plot thickens as a few additional facts are added to the 
tale. When the police arrived at Zola Blair's home (actually Zola 
Blair's mother's home where Zoia lived) to execute the "pick up" 
order on February 5, 1982, they allegedly saw a car illegally parked 
outside the house. Upon radioing the address back to the dis-
patcher before entering the house, they discovered that Zola herself 
was not only a murder "suspect," she was also the subject of an 
outstanding municipal parking violation "warrant." (Actually, no 
physical warrant existed, just an entry noting the existence of the 
parking violation in a computerized file.) 
91. The state also alleged that the police had found the victim's sofa in the 
home of James Blair. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 
(1986). But no tie was demonstrated between 7ola Blair and this residence or the 
sofa, and this fact was not considered relevant by the Missouri courts. 
92. "In this case, it is undisputed that the police lacked probable cause to 
arrest defendant on the homicide charge. . . ." State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 261 
(Mo. 1985); State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984) ("it was con-
ceded that there existed no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant"). 
93. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1987). 
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As a result, when Zola Blair's defense attorney successfully ar-
gued in the Missouri courts that the unknown informant's double 
hearsay tip did not establish probable cause to arrest her for homi-
cide, the prosecution responded that, in that event, the informant's 
tip should be treated as irrelevant because Zola Blair was arrested 
for the parking violation. Since she was lawfully under arrest for 
something, the argument went, her palm prints were constitutional 
acquired. 
The Missouri courts were not, however, so easily deceived 
Blair's defense attorney won his pretrial suppression motion in the 
trial court and had it affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals and 
the Missouri Supreme Court. He won because the Missouri courts 
recognized what was absolutely crystal clear on the record before 
them, namely that Zola Blair was arrested for homicide, not bad 
parking. The prosecution, the Missouri courts concluded, brought 
up the parking violation "warrant" simply as a pretext to justify her 
otherwise unlawful arrest for homicide. As the Missouri Supreme 
Court ruled, even "lajssuming an arrest for the parking violation, 
the arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a pretext 
employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide."94 
On the facts, it is rather hard, if not impossible, to quibble with 
the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion: it was a homicide detective 
who ordered Zola Blair's "pick up," she was given Miranda warnings 
(people booked for traffic offenses in this jurisdiction are not given 
such warnings), she was taken to the downtown homicfde unit (people 
booked for parking violations in this jurisdiction are taken to district 
police stations or the headquarters detention unit, whichever is 
nearer), her finger and palm prints were taken when she arrived 
downtown as is standard procedure for a homicide (people booked on 
parking offenses in this jurisdiction have only a right index finger 
impression taken), she was booked on the homicide charges, and she 
was questioned by homicide detectives about the homicide.95 It was not 
until after the homicide unit released her on February 6, 1982, that 
Zola Blair was picked up again, fourteen minutes later, then 
"booked" on the parking violation and an impression of her right 
index finger taken. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded on this 
plain record, as it affirmed the court of appeal's affirmance of the 
trial court's order suppressing the evidence against Blair that 4t[t]he 
record in this case supports the ruling of the trial court. The execu-
tion of the parking violation warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext 
. . . to gather evidence of the unrelated crime of homicide."96 
Neither the Missouri Court of Appeals nor the Missouri 
94. Slate v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259. 262 (Mo. 1985), cert, granted sub nom. Mis-
souri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049, cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987). 
95. ld.\ State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3. 1984). 
96. 691 S.W.2d at 263. 
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Supreme Court discussed the question whether this pretext was es-
tablished on the record objectively or subjectively. This is not sur-
prising. There was no reason to discuss or choose between these 
approaches since, as the objective evidence was crystal clear,97 there 
was no need to look at the arresting officers' subjective motivations, 
which were, in any event, equally clear.98 The Missouri Supreme 
Court simply cited federal and Missouri authorities for the settled 
proposition that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search 
for evidence"99 and reasoned that "[underlying these cases is ap-
preciation for the far reaching consequences of allowing the com-
mon offense of a traffic violation to serve as a justification for an 
otherwise unconstitutional search.'*100 On this basis, a four-justice 
majority of the Court affirmed the trial court order sustaining Blair's 
motion to suppress, holding that '[tjhe record in this case supports 
the ruling of the trial court. The execution of the parking violation 
warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext . . . to gather evidence of the 
unrelated crime of homicide.",()l Three Missouri Supreme Court 
justices dissented. Justice Blackmar, writing for the dissenters, con-
cluded in contrast to the majority opinion that 4t[t]he common 
theme of the pretext cases is that the police arrested people without 
reason. The police had a valid pre-existing warrant for Zola Blair's 
97. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
98. The officer who took Blair into custody testified, for example, that he went 
to her home to pick her up pursuant to the "pick up" order from the homicide unit 
and that he intended to detain her on that basis. Brief for Respondent at 16, Mis-
souri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986) (citing hearing transcript at 42-43). See also 
State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984) ("[Patrolman] Stewart 
testified that he went to the residence to pick her up on the homicide pickup"). 
99. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Mo. 1985) (citing United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th 
Cir. 1961); State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1970); State v. Howell, 543 
S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. App. 1976)), cert, granted sub nom. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 
1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987). 
100. 691 S.W.2d at 263 (citing Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 
(5th Cir. 1968)). 
101. 691 S.W.2d at 263. See also State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 
3, 1984) ("[I]t appears beyond peradventure that [Blair's) arrest on the parking 
violation charge was but a pretext, motivated by the police officers* desire to gather 
evidence, in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
United States Constitution."). 
The Missouri Supreme Court further ruled that 
[t]he palm and finger prints and statements obtained on February 5, 1982, 
were properly suppressed because they resulted from an unlawful arrest 
and search. Because the illegally seized evidence provided the sole basis 
for the arrest warrant for homicide on February 8, 1982, and led directly 
to [Blair's] statements on that day, the warrant and statement are also 
inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree." 
691 S.W.2d at 263 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). The 
state's further argument that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule applied was held to be "without merit." Id. 
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arrest. Any procedural irregularities which occurred afterward 
should not invalidate the arrest."102 
B. Argument to the Supreme Court 
After certiorari was granted on the state's petition, the state's 
argument to the Supreme Court on the pretext issues boiled down 
to advocacy of two basic points.103 First, the state argued that 
Blair's 
arrest on an outstanding, pre-existing arrest warrant for a 
municipal parking violation, justified her custodial arrest 
and the taking of a full set of fingerprints incident to that 
arrest, and the arrest and subsequent search were not ren-
dered 'pretextual' and therefore in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment simply because the police also wished to ques-
tion her about an unrelated homicide and take her finger-
prints so that they could be compared to a palm print 
found at the scene of the homicide.104 
Second, the state argued that 4t[t]he decision of the Missouri 
Supreme Court essentially holds that an objectively lawful arrest, 
made pursuant to a valid warrant, can somehow be transformed into 
an invalid arrest merely because of the subjective intent of the ar-
resting officers. Such reasoning has repeatedly been rejected by this 
Court."105 
The thrust of Zola Blair's response to these arguments106 was 
102. 691 S.W.2d at 267. Justice Blackmar added that 
[i]nasmuch as there was basis for a lawful arrest, the order of proceedings 
should make no difference. The time of booking on the traffic warrant is 
an immaterial circumstance. It would be ludicrous to suggest that sup-
pression must be ordered because the police did not retake her finger-
prints after she was booked on the traffic warrant. 
Id. at 266. 
103. The state also argued in the alternative that even if the arrest was pretex-
tual and, hence, unconstitutional, the suppression order was nonetheless inappro-
priate because: (1) the arresting officers acted in good faith, (2) the evidence would 
nonetheless have been inevitably discovered, and/or Zola Blair's subsequent state-
ments were not fruits of the illegality. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Missouri v. Blair, 
474 U.S. 1049 (1986). 
104. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The state conceded that, 44[t]o be sure, the 
police were more interested in determining the extent of [Zola Blair's] involvement 
in the death of 59-year-old Carl Lindstedt than they were in making her answer for 
the municipal parking violation." Id. at 15. 
105. Id. at 12 (citations to Scott, Villamonte-Marqun, and Macon omitted). The 
Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, and Macon decisions are discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 10-38. 
106. Blair also argued that the parking warrant arrest was in any event unlawful 
under Missouri law which requires actual possession of the arrest warrant and that 
no exception to the exclusionary rule appropriately applied. Brief for Respondent 
at 10. 13, 18-11), 4 1-45, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986). 
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that the supposed parking violation arrest was clearly "a pretext 
concealing a motive to arrest for the primary purpose of searching 
for and seizing [her] inked palm impressions and interrogating her 
pursuant to a homicide investigation."107 Hence, she argued, the 
Missouri Supreme Court acted correctly in upholding the trial 
court's suppression of the fruits of that pretextual arrest because 
*[a]n arrest ostensibly for one purpose but in reality for the primary 
purpose of furthering an ulterior goal is unreasonable under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."I08 
C. Analysis 
In light of the pretext commentaries previously discussed,109 
the pretext issues expressly or impliedly resolved in the majority 
and dissenting opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court in Blair can 
be parsed as follows. The Blair majority rejected (if implicitly) Pro-
fessor Haddad's "hard choices'* approach to pretext analysis, using 
instead what Haddad called the "case-by-case" approach that per-
mits consideration of the existence of pretextual activity in each in-
dividual case.110 The Blair majority did not, however, explicitly use 
cither Professor LaFave's "objective" case-by-case analysis of pre-
texts or my "subjective" case-by-case analysis. As previously noted, 
on the record in the Blair case, there was no need to be explicit 
about which case—by—case approach was being used.111 Even 
under my so-called "subjective approach" to pretext analysis, a re-
viewing court need not assess the relevant law enforcement officer's 
subjective motivation for engaging in fourth amendment activity when 
107. Id. at 11. 
108. Id. (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (I960); United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)). The court in Blair added: 
Overlooking the primary purpose of a search or seizure would reap such 
abuse, encourage such capricious searches and arrests, and engender such 
disrespect and resentment of law enforcement that this Court should not 
adopt such a position. Exceptions to the warrant requirement would be 
used as investigative tools instead of for the purpose they were created. 
Traffic offenses are easily committed, authorizing arrests in most states. 
Searches of the person and automobile would follow automatically. In-
ventory searches of impounded vehicles would be used as investigative 
tools. The plain view doctrine would no longer require discovery of evi-
dence to be inadvertent. Administrative warrants pursuant to health, fire 
and building codes could be used to further criminal investigations. Police 
would generate facts ostensibly calling for the application of an exception 
to the warrant requirement or for a warrant. This search or arrest power 
would then be used for exploratory searches, out of caprice, or to harass 
or punish, 
/rf.at 11-12. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 39-85. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 62-85. 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
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the objective facts clearly demonstrate—as they did here—that a pre-
text was present.112 Since both the objective and subjective fact* 
were clear in this case and led to the same conclusion, there was 
simply no need to rest the Court's decision upon the arresting of 
fleer's motivations, which were, in any event, confessedh 
pretextual.113 
The dissenters on the Missouri Supreme Court in Blair took a 
different approach altogether to this subject. They did not dispute 
the proposition that the use of a case-by-case approach to analysis of 
pretexts as constitutional or unconstitutinal was appropriate.1 u 
Rather, they concluded that this case simply was not a pretext case 
because "[tjhe common theme of the pretext cases is that the police 
arrested people without a reason,"115 and that, in this case, "[t]he 
police had a valid pre-existing [parking] warrant for Zola Blair's 
arrest."1 H> In short, there was no pretext here, in the dissenters' 
view, because the parking violation "was [a] basis for a lawful 
arrest." , l7 
This supposed "objective" approach utilized by the Blair dis-
senters should not be confused with Professor LaFave's "objective" 
approach to pretext analysis. They are totally different. Under Pro-
fessor LaFave's approach, the "objective" question to be asked in 
assessing whether a cognizable, unconstitutional pretext exists is 
whether this supposed parking arrest was "carried out in accordance 
with standard procedures in the local police department."118 This 
question is, of course, easy to answer and easily establishes a pretext 
on the Blair facts since the pick-up/arrest clearly deviated from stan-
dard procedures for traffic or parking offenses.119 But that fact of 
arbitrary deviation from standard procedures was irrelevant to the 
Blair dissenters. Rather, their point was that since it was possible to 
make a legitimate parking arrest in the Blair circumstances,120 it 
does not matter for constitutional purposes that this parking arrest 
was not in fact a normal parking arrest or undertaken for that pur-
112. See supra noies 43-45 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
114. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 266-67 (Mo. 1985), cert, granted sub nom. 
Missouri v. Blair. 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987). The 
dissent cites a number of pretext cases in an approving fashion, but distinguishes 
them on the grounds discussed in the text which follows. 
115. Id. at 267. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 266. 
118. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
119. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
120. This point is, parenthetically, not as self-evident as the Blair dissenters 
thought. Under Missouri law in effect at the time of the pick up/arrest, a warrant 
issued on the basis of a nonappearance to answer a parking violation ticket needed 
to be in the possession of the arresting officer in order to be validly executed. Mo. 
RF.V. STAT. § 544.180 (1978); Rustici v. Weidemeyer. 673 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. 1984). 
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pose. In short, the Blair dissenters argued that since probable cause 
to arrest Zola Blair for her criminal parking existed, it does not mat-
ter how (LaFave's analysis) or why (my analysis) she was in fact ar-
rested for such a violation. 
I think this is a very dangerous position to take121 and I have 
elsewhere criticized this result-oriented view of pretext law by not-
ing that 
It is one thing to conclude, as both LaFave and this 
author do, that a police officers improper rationale for a 
search is rendered constitutionally irrelevant when a 
proper and independently sufficient rationale is also pres-
ent at the time of the search; it is another thing entirely to 
argue that an improper rationale that was the sole basis for 
a search is irrelevant when, absent that rationale, the police 
<4would have" engaged in the same search with a proper 
rationale. This hypothetical "proper rationale" bears no 
more relation to the search that was actually conducted 
than does the probable cause that unbeknowst to the 
searching officer "objectively" exists elsewhere in the uni-
verse. Like those "objective" facts, a hypothesized "proper 
rationale" for a search is irrelevant to its constitutionality. 
The search must be evaluated on the basis of the facts upon which the 
officer actually acted, not those that an imaginative prosecutor might 
argue the officer would have acted upon under some other hypotheti-
cal circumstance.122 
If the Blair dissenters' narrow view of pretext were to prevail, 
anyone who has an outstanding parking or traffic "warrant" could 
be arrested at any time because the police wanted to investigate any 
other offense. The fourth amendment's requirement of probable 
cause would, in essence, be nullified as to that individual with re-
spect to virtually any searches or seizures the police wanted to make. 
And, considering the probable number of individuals with outstand-
ing traffic or parking tickets that exist in this country, it is highly 
likely that literally millions of Americans would fall into this cate-
121. The Blair dissenters are not the only judges to take this flawed position. See 
also, e.g., Judge Gee's majority opinion in United Slates v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 
1185 n . l l (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), finding nothing wrong with the arrest of a 
defendant. Causey, on a seven and one-half year old bench warrant for a misde-
meanor theft charge in order to question him about a bank robbery for which there 
was no probable cause: "Causey had, long before the police apprehended him, 
foreited his right to be free from arrest. He was already the object of an arrest 
warrant; he had been subject to arrest at all times since its issuance; and he can 
scarcely complain that the police finally got around to executing a valid warrant." 
Id. 
122. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 105 (footnotes omitted) (empha-
sis added). 
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gory.123 Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has elo-
quently made this same point in dissent in a case decided 
subsequent to the Supreme Court's short-lived consideration of 
Blair: 
In the kind of society in which we live, few persons 
have a life so blameless that some reason to arrest them 
cannot be found, whether it be for entering an intersection 
when the light is on caution, or for violating a zoning regu-
lation, or for having an expired brake tag. The fourth 
amendment protection against arrests without probable 
cause is designed to protect citizens against being arrested 
for such a matter when there is no objective justification for 
the arrest save the police's desire to question the person in 
custody about a matter for which they lack the authority to 
make an arrest. 
123. See, e.g.. United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1189-90 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Rubin, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted): 
News reports indicate how many millions will be exposed to pretextual 
arrest . . . either because a warrant to arrest them for some offense has 
already been issued or because they have been charged with an offense for 
which a warrant might be obtained. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
has been testing a system that permits inquiries about criminal suspects 
from every state to be compared with names registered in a computer. 
"The primary purpose of the project is to devise a national communica-
tions system through which a policeman in New York, a prosecutor in Chi-
cago or a judge in Los Angeles will be able to determine swiftly whether 
the suspects they are holding have ever been arrested in any other state." 
Five years ago policemen were routinely using the system more than 
300,000 times a day to answer such questions as whether a car is stolen. 
Syracuse, New York, has 20,000 delinquent parking tickets. In To-
ledo, Ohio, 31,890 parking tickets were reported delinquent, and, after 
intensified police efforts, only slightly more than half were paid. In Indi-
anapolis, Indiana, "Itjhe computer told polite they could find 5,800 de-
fendants at 2,700 companies. It also showed there were 28,000 
outstanding warrants for traffic offenses, 9,000 for misdemeanors and 
1,500 for felonies." Indianapolis police reported an estimated 27,000 
such lawbreakers. 
Washington, D.C. has records of 500,000 residents of Maryland, Vir-
ginia, and the District of Columbia who have failed to pay parking tickets. 
Los Angeles has considered an amnesty program in which 810,000 traffic 
offenses carried on the court's computer docket might be settled by pay-
ment "while having arrest warrants dismissed." 
These are but examples. Current technology has made it possible for 
every police system in the nation to record in a computer the name of 
every traffic offender and every other person wanted for any offense, how-
ever trivial, and for a national system to collate all of these records. 
Id. 
It should not be difficult to convince the Supreme Court to take judicial notice 
of the fact that even ordinarily law-abiding citizens occasionally receive such tickets. 
Cf Rehnquist Is Given Ticket for Speeding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 10, col. 1. 
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Untold thousands of Americans are subject to arrest 
for failing to pay parking tickets, failure to respond to sum-
monses for traffic violations, and similar minor offenses 
. . . . Police who desire to arrest an individual without 
probable cause may merely leaf through the files or turn to 
the computer to determine whether they can find some rea-
sons to arrest a suspect for whose arrest they otherwise lack 
probable cause, just as the police did when they set out to 
find some pretext to arrest [the defendant in this case]. 
While I do not condone the possible law violations that led 
to the imposition of the earlier charges, I do not think such 
prior derelictions strip the alleged lawbreakers of fourth 
amendment protection if they should later be suspected of 
other offenses.124 
Are such claims of the erosion of constitutional protections hy-
perbolic or exaggerated? Well, the Missouri Supreme Court's Blair 
decision, accepted on certiorari, gave the United States Supreme 
Court the opportunity to answer this question as well as to answer 
or reaffirm the answer to two of the most important and controver-
sial doctrinal questions relating to pretexts, namely: 
(1) Was the Blair Court correct in applying a case-by-case 
pretext analysis? Or, put another way, was the Blair Court 
correct in assuming that suppression of evidence seized as 
a result of pretextual fourth amendment activity was com-
pelled or otherwise appropriate? 
(2) Was the Blair Court majority correct in ruling that 
when the record evidence established that an arrest was 
made in bad faith, i.e., as a pretextual means to arrest and 
acquire evidence about a crime where there was no prob-
able cause, the arrest was ipso facto unconstitutional? Or, in 
contrast, were the Blair Court dissenters correct in arguing 
that where the record established that a lawful parking 
arrest could be made, it does not matter how or why such an 
arrest was actually made? 
124. Causey, 834 F.2d at 1189 (Rubin, J., dissenting). In Causey, the Fifth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, on an 8 to 6 vote, reversed a prior panel decision at 818 F.2d 354 
(5th Cir. 1987), which had found the pretext arrest at issue in that case to be uncon-
stitutional. The reach of the Causey majority opinion is limited, however, by the 
comments of one of the judges in the majority (whose vote was necessary to make 
up the bare majority) who specifically noted that 
there is a risk that with the storage and retrieval capability of today's com-
puters, warrants may function in a manner similar to the old general writs 
of assistance. . . . Our conclusion today . . . does not tolerate such a stor-
ing of warrants. We decide no issues attending a system of obtaining war-
rants and "warehousing'* them for a purpose other than to arrest for the 
offense for which probable cause is found. 
834 F.2d at 1186 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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While these two specific issues set out above were clearly before 
the Supreme Court arising out of the Missouri Supreme Court's de-
cision in Blair, the briefs of the parties to the Court, as is perhaps to 
be expected, muddied the waters just a bit. The state contended 
that Zola Blair's arrest was not pretextual "simply because the po-
lice also wished to question her about an unrelated homicide and 
take her fingerprints.*"25 The state also argued that the Blair major-
ity decision "essentially holds that an objectively lawful arrest, made 
pursuant to a valid warrant, can somehow be transformed into an 
invalid arrest merely because of the subjective intent of the arresting 
officers/*126 
Both of these arguments misstate the record and the Missouri 
Supreme Court's holding in Blair. The Blair Court did not find, as 
the state suggested, that the record facts presented a situation in-
volving "mixed motives," i.e., that the police were acting for a mix of 
proper and improper reasons.127 I have argued that in such mixed 
motives cases, there is a cognizable unconstitutional pretext only if, 
borrowing former Justice Powell's formula from Michigan v. Clif-
ford,l2H the improper motive is "the primary object of the search.",29 
Professor Haddad has responded that if a motive-oriented test was 
used by the Court, it should require evidentiary suppression in a 
broader category of cases, namely where "the improper motivation 
played a significant role in the officers' decisional process/"30 But 
neither Haddad's nor my approach would have been dispositive in 
Blair because the Missouri Supreme Court ruled (as had the lower 
courts) that the reasons for Zola Blair's arrest were entirely improper: 
"[T]he arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a pretext 
employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide . . . .",31 
Accordingly, the state misstated the record in arguing to the United 
States Supreme Court that the Blair case involved the issue of 
whether a lawful arrest was rendered pretextual simply because the 
!25. See supra text accompanying note !04. 
126. See supta text accompanying note 105. 
127. See discussion of mixed motives in BurkofT, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, 
at 103-04; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 534; Haddad, supra note 
16, at 649. 674 n.158. 683-85; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 698 n.16; Note, 
supra note 23, at 257-63. 
128. 464 U.S. 287 (1984). 
129. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 697-98, 698 n.16. 
130. Haddad, supra note 16, at 684 (emphasis original) (citing Brest, Palmer v. 
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motivation, 1971 
SUP. CT. REV. 95, 130-31). 
131. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Mo. 1985). cert, granted sub nom. Mis-
souri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987). The court 
added that "(tjhe record in this case supports the ruling of the trial court [that t]he 
execution of the parking violation warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext . . . to 
gather evidence of the unrelated crime of homicide." Id. at 263. 
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police questioned the arrestee about other crimes.132 That is an in-
teresting question, but, it was not before the Supreme Court in 
Blair, 
The second pretext issue raised by the State of Missouri in its 
brief to the Supreme Court in Blair, that the Missouri Supreme 
Court had used a subjective pretext analysis, was also a misstate-
ment of the Missouri Supreme Court's holding. As previously dis-
cussed, the issue of the significance of the subjective motivations of 
the arresting law enforcement officers in Blair was simply not part of 
the Blair Court's decision, nor was it necessary to the decision.133 
The pretext arguments raised by Zola Blair before the Supreme 
Court simply and understandably {i.e., she won below) followed the 
lead of the Missouri Supreme Court majority urging that a finding 
of pretext was clearly established on the record.134 In addition, 
Blair went a step further. She asked the Court in her brief to ac-
knowledge the fact that the subjective intent of law enforcement of-
ficers is—and has been—a relevant consideration in assessing the 
existence of pretext,135 warning that t4[i]f [the] subjective intent of 
the police is made totally irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis, 
such activity will never be deterred as it will never come to the atten-
tion of the courts."136 
As I have noted, this issue of the significance of the subjective 
intention of the arresting officers was not directly before the 
Supreme Court in Blair.™1 Nonetheless, given the posture of the 
case as argued to the Court, it was conceivable that the Court might 
also express its views on a third question, not included within the 
132. The state was wildly excessive in its argument on this point, contending 
chat the "effect (of the Missouri Supreme Court's Blair decision] would be to immu-
nize from arrest those parking violators who are suspected of serious crimes, while 
allowing the arrest of all other nonsuspicious violators." Brief for Petitioner at 32-
33. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986). The state added: "This is foolish-
ness." Id. at 33. The state was, at least, correct on that score. It would, of course, 
not have been a pretext if Zola Blair had been lawfully arrested for murder, 
whatever her status as a parking violator. 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98, 111-13. The state once again 
taxed hyperbolic on this non-issue, warning the Court that "[i]f the decision of the 
Missouri Supreme Court is allowed to stand, it would be the first case where an 
otherwise lawful arrest, made pursuant to a valid, pre-existing arrest warrant, was 
held unlawful simply because of the subjective intent of the arresting officers." 
Brief for Petitioner at 32, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986) (footnote omit-
ted). Not only is this an untrue and inaccurate statement of the Missouri Supreme 
Court's majority opinion, it is also not true that if this case did rely solely on the 
subjective intent of the arresting officers, it would be an unprecedented case. 
There are hundreds of such cases (and rightfully so). See, e.g., decisions cited supra 
note 56. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 101. 
135. Brief for Respondent at 22-41, Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986). 
136. Id. at 39. 
137. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
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two issues set out previously arising out of the Missouri Supreme 
Court's decision. That third question is: 
(3) Is the subjective motivation of the searching or arrest-
ing officers—their bad faith (or lack thereof)—properly 
considered in assessing whether or not there is a cogniza-
ble pretext? 
As previously discussed, none of these three questions—or any 
other issue relating to fourth amendment pretexts—was discussed 
or resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Blair because the 
Court simply and inexplicably dismissed the writ of certiorari as im-
providently granted.139 Nonetheless, the justices must have clearly 
considered, analyzed, and debated these pretext issues and argu-
ments since they later expressed their collective views on these mat-
ters in the very same term that the Blair case was argued and 
dismissed. These views were propounded in four decisions handed 
down after the oral argument in Blair: Colorado i/. Bertine,140 Mary-
land v. Garrison,141 O'Connor v. Ortega?4* and New York v. Burger}41 If 
there was any question (as there obviously was in some minds) 
whether a viable pretext doctrine existed after the Supreme Court's 
unfortunate obiter dicta in Scott and unfortunate footnote in Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, these four decisions resolved that question, making 
it clear that the doctrine is very much alive and well. 
IV. THE "RETURN" OF PRETEXT LAW: BERTINE, GARRISON, 
ORTEGA, AND BURGER * 
A. Colorado v. Bertine 
In Colorado v. Bertine,144 the Supreme Court ruled that the suspi-
cionless inventory search of the contents of a van belonging to an 
arrestee, Steven Bertine, was constitutional. Bertine had already 
been taken into custody for driving while under the influence of al-
cohol when the van was searched. The van was towed to an im-
poundment lot only after the inventory search took place. 
During the inventory search, the searching officer discovered 
narcotics contained in metal' canisters in a nylon bag in a closed 
backpack that was found directly behind the front seat of the van. 
The Supreme Court majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
138. The oral argument in Blair before ihe Supreme Court reflected various jus-
tices' keen intciest in this third issue. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. 
140. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
141. 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
142. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
143. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987). 
144. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
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quist, held that the discovery of the narcotics was constitutional de-
spite the absence of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) to 
search anywhere: the van, the backpack, the nylon bag, or the metal 
canisters. Rehnquist cited in support of the conclusion that prob-
able cause was unnecessary the following language from South Da-
kota v. Oppennan: "The standard of probable cause is peculiarly 
related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal proce-
dures. . . . The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis 
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretak-
mg functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective proce-
dures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.11145 
As previously noted,140 South Dakota v. Opperman is a paradig-
matic case reaffirming the constitutional validity of what Professor 
Haddad had critically termed 4icase-by-case" pretext analysis. In 
Oppennan, the Supreme Court held that inventory searches of 
automobiles are an exception to the fourth amendment warrant and 
probable cause requirements and, accordingly, may only be made for 
routine administrative caretaking purposes. As a result, the Opper-
man Court ruled that law enforcement officers cannot make such 
suspicionless searches pretextually for the actual purpose of crimi-
nal investigation. The Bertine Court's approving quotation of the 
language in Opperman making this point is, in and of itself, an im-
plicit reaffirmation of the appropriateness of this type of case-by-
case approach to pretext analysis. But the Bertine Court went farther 
still and made this implicit point explicit. 
After finding that the inventory search of Bertine's van and its 
contents was constitutional even in the absence of probable cause 
due to the special status of such routine administrative searches, the 
Court made clear that this exceptional administrative search rule ap-
plied, however, in the Bertine case only because there was no evi-
dence of pretext on the record. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, 
"In the present case, as in Opperman and Lafayette147, there was no 
showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in 
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation."14* 
This is a critical point for understanding the Court's view of 
how the pretext search doctrine applies. The Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Bertine that suspicionless inventory searches of the contents of 
vehicles are constitutional was explicitly conditioned upon the find-
ing that there was no evidence that the police officers were not mak-
145. Id. at 371 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. 370 n.5 
(1976)). 
146. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
147. The reference is to Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), a case that 
held constitutional the suspicionless inventory search of personal effects in a shoul-
der bag carried by an arrestee at a police station. 
148. 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (emphasis added). 
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ing precisely what the search purported to be, namely an inventory 
(not an investigative) search. Following the Bertine Court's lan-
guage, a defendant could demonstrate that a search was not in fact 
an inventory, i.e., that it was pretextual, by making a showing that 
the police failed to follow "standardized procedures" or "acted in 
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation."149 
This language from Bertine is, of course, a striking reaffirmation 
of the so-called case-by-case approach to pretext analysis. If Bertine 
had been able to make this showing of pretext in his case, the search 
would have been declared unconstitutional because it was not in fact 
what it purported to be. Moreover, the Bertine Court's exposition of 
this point is also an express endorsement of the sort of "objective" 
analysis of pretext urged by Professor LaFave150 coupled with the 
sort of "subjective" analysis I have urged.'51 
LaFave's "objective" approach is followed in Bertine by the 
Court's requirement that for the inventory search to be constitu-
tional, the searching officers must have followed "standardized pro-
cedures." Reference to this phrase was not inadvertent. The Bertine 
Court strongly reiterated this requirement later in its opinion, again 
citing Opperman and Lafayette, and declared, "We emphasize that, in 
this case, the trial court found that the police department's proce-
dures mandated the opening of closed containers and the listing of 
their contents. Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement ihai 
inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria.'*152 
Indeed, it is worth noting that the "standardized procedures" 
requirement was set out not only in the Rehnquist majority opinion 
but was emphatically endorsed by all nine of the justices in Bertine. 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Powell and O'Connor, wrote a 
brief, separate concurring opinion in Bertine specifically for the pur-
pose of "underscoring] the importance of having such inventories 
conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures."153 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented in Bertine, but 
acknowledged nonetheless that "[standardized procedures are nec-
essary to ensure that this narrow exception is not improperly used 
to justify, after the fact, a warrantless investigative foray."154 
The Bertine Court, as previously noted, did not simply reaffirm 
an objective approach to pretext analysis; rather, it also expressly 
endorsed the use of the sort of "subjective," "bad-faith," "case-by-
case" analysis of pretexts that I have long been urging.155 As the 
149. Id. 
150. See supia text accompanying notes 46-61. 
151. Set supra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
152. Beitine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
153. Id. at 376 (Blackmun. J., concurring). 
154. Id. at 381 (M.tishall. J.. dissenting). 
155. See sitpia text accompanying notes 39-45. 
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Bertine majority stressed, this particular inventory search was consti-
tutional as an inventory search not only because there was no show-
ing of the failure to follow "standardized procedures," but also 
because "there was no showing that the police . . . acted in bad faith or 
for the sole purpose of investigation."15** Despite Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's curious disjunctive reference to a showing either of "bad 
faith" or an improper "sole purpose" on the part of the searching 
officers, the import of this language is clear, namely that a subjective 
approach to pretext analysis is not merely legitimate, it is an essen-
tial part of fourth amendment doctrine in this area. The Bertine ma-
jority reiterated this point later in its opinion when it held that "[w]e 
conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police regulations re-
lating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment."157 
It is important to stress that the objective and subjective pretext 
criteria are also repeatedly used by the Bertine Court in the disjunc-
tive. This is an important point because it means that a showing of 
either type of proof of pretext satisfies the test set out in Bertine and 
serves to make such a search unconstitutional. Hence, even where 
the police procedures are themselves objectively reasonable, a 
showing of the absence of good faith, i.e., bad faith or subjective 
pretextual motivation, is sufficient in se to establish unconstitutional 
activity. The Bertine Court made the disjunctive appiicaiion of its 
pretext test patent when it summed up its pretext analysis as applied 
to the particular facts of Bertine in the penultimate paragraph of the 
opinion as follows: 
Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of 
police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised ac-
cording to standard criteria [the objective test] and on the 
basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of 
criminal activity [the subjective test]. Here, the discretion 
afforded the Boulder police was exercised in light of stan-
dardized criteria, related to the feasibility and appropriate-
ness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than 
impounding it. [Hence, no objective evidence of pretext.] 
There was no showing that the police chose to impound 
Bertine's van in order to investigate suspected criminal ac-
156. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). While I urged at one time adop-
tion of a bad-faith pretext test like the "sole purpose" language used in the disjunc-
ti\e in this quotation from Bertine, see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 103-
04. I have moderated in my dotage and favor the more workable "primary object" 
\*\i first announced by former Justice Powell in Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 
294 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 128-29; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 
9. at 698 n.16. 
157. 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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tivity. [Hence, no subjective evidence of pretext.]158 i 
As previously discussed, there is absolutely no tension between 
the Bertine Court's acceptance o{both an objective and subjective pre' 
text analysis.159 Indeed, this is the appropriate way to analyze pre-
texts. The subjective test is best considered a supplementary one ] 
useful to illuminate the meaning of otherwise neutral-appearing 
(objective) police conduct. Where law enforcement search and 
seizure activity is patently objectively unconstitutional, there is sim-
ply no need to turn to a subjective analysis of the searching officers 
motivations for undertaking the search.160 Where, on the other 
hand, the objective evidence is facially neutral, i.e., it neither sup 
ports nor precludes unconstitutional motivation, a defendant hasj 
the opportunity to establish—where he or she can—the existence of 
an unconstitutional motivation in that case, the intent in fact to! 
make an investigatory search. j 
In sum, the Bertine Court reaffirmed that a defendant may estab-! 
lish that a purported inventory search was unconstitutional whercl 
the searching officers: (1) did not possess probable cause, and! 
(2) the defendant can establish either (a) that the officers failed to 
follow "standardized procedures" in their inventory activity, or 
(b) that there was "bad faith" on the part of the searching officers or 
that the search was undertaken "for the sole purpose of investiga-
tion."161 If there was ever truly any question whether the Supreme 
Court accepts case-by-case application of the pretext search doc 
158. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). j 
159. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 43-45, note 45, and tei 
accompanying note 52. 
160. This is what happened in the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion in Mis-I 
souri v. Blair. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98 and 111-13. Moreover, all 
lowing for some differences in terminology, this is assumably the same point madq 
in dissent in Bertine by Justice Marshall when he offered his own explanation of thj 
majority result as follows: j 
Standardized procedures are necessary to ensure that this narrow [inven-
tory search I exception is not improperly used to justify, after the fact, a 
warrantless investigative foray. Accordingly, to invalidate a search that is 
conducted without established procedures, it is not necessary to establish 
that the police actually acted in bad faith, or that the inventory was in fact a 
"pretext ." 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added). 
Other than the fact that Justice Marshall implicitly equates use of the tern 
"pretext" only with a subjective analysis, this explanation fully comports with th< 
majority holding. Where an objective showing of pretext is made, it is totally un 
necessary to also make a subjective, bad-faith showing of pretext in order to estab 
lish the unconstitutionality of the police conduct. Nonetheless, as the Supremi 
Court majority in Bertine repeatedly staled, a showing that bad faith existed (u. 
that the search was actually investigatory) is sufficient in and of itself to render sud 
a purported inventory search pretextual and, hence, unconstitutional. 
161. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. 
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trine,H>2 the Bertine decision should have settled the issue once and 
for all. 
B. Maryland v. Garrison 
One month after the Supreme Court decided Bertine, it handed 
down another fourth amendment decision, Maryland v. Garrison.165 
The Garrison Court shed additional light on the question whether a 
law enforcement officer's subjective intent to engage in unconstitu-
tional activity could render otherwise objectively neutral activity un-
constitutional. Consistent with the analysis and holding in the 
Bertine decision, the Garrison Court answered this question in the 
affirmative. 
In Garrison, a majority of the Supreme Court held constitutional 
a search by Baltimore police officers of the wrong apartment pursu-
ant to a search warrant. The warrant authorized a search for mari-
juana of the person of Lawrence McWebb and "the premises known 
as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment."164 In fact, unbe-
knownst to the police, the third floor of the residence located at 
2036 Park Avenue was divided into two apartments, one occupied 
by McWebb and the other by defendant, Harold Garrison, who was 
neither a target of the search nor otherwise under suspicion. The 
executing officers went into Garrison's apartment by mistake and, 
before they became aware of their error, they discovered heroin.165 
Garrison claimed that since the police did not have a warrant to 
enter his apartment, the heroin was seized as a result of an unconsti-
tutional search and should, accordingly, be suppressed. The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
Justice Stevens, writing for a six-justice majority of the Court in 
Garrison, held the search and seizure constitutional because, 
although mistaken about whose premises they were searching, the 
executing officers "perceived McWebb's apartment and the third-
floor premises as one and the same; therefore their execution of the 
warrant reasonably included the entire third floor . . . [since] the 
officers' conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain 
and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment/*166 
162. As previously discussed, Professor Haddad has argued that the Supreme 
Court has never accepted such an approach. See supra text accompany notes 63-64 
and 84. 
163. 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
164. Id. at 80. There was no question that the warrant to search McWebb and 
his premises was valid and supported by probable cause. Id. 
165. As the officers entered the third floor vestibule, they could see the interior 
of McWebb's apartment to their left and Garrison's to the right as the doors to both 
apartments were open. Id. 
166. Id. at 88-89 (footnotes omitted). 
400 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3* 
The reasonableness of the executing officers' mistake about the 
apartment they were in was, however, critical to this holding. The 
officers* belief that they were in McWebb's apartment was a reason 
able one, the Court concluded, given the physical configuration a 
the 2036 Park Avenue third floor. As Justice Stevens reasoned: 
[T]he validity of the search of [Garrison's] apartment pur-
suant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third 
floor depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the over-
breadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reason-
able. Here it unquestionably was. The objective facts 
available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction 
between McWebb's apartment and the third-floor 
premises.Mi7 
In essence, the rule that the Garrison Court adopted to govern 
when mistaken searches of premises pursuant to a valid warrant arc 
constitutional is a reasonable good-faith test. The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of this search and seizure due to the confluence of 
the proper subjective criteria, i.e., the executing officers believed in 
good-faith that they were in the right place, and objective criteria, U, 
that belief was reasonable. As Justice Stevens explained, "[This] 
Court has . . . recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest 
mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult pro-
cess of making arrests and executing search warrants/'168 
But we are not interested in this Article ip honest mistakes; we 
are interested in pretexts, searches or seizures undertaken for rea-
sons that do not constitute a proper legal justification for such activ-
ity. To analyze the relationship between the pretext issue and the 
law relating to the constitutionality of an honest mistake, consider a 
new case, arising after the Garrison decision, that poses the Garrison 
case facts with everything unchanged except one critical fact: the 
executing officers know full well that they are in the wrong place, 
namely Garrison's apartment. Perhaps it is belaboring the obvious 
to point out that there are any number of explanations for why po-
lice officers might want to search Garrison's apartment even though 
they know it is his and that they have a warrant only for McWebb's 
premises. Perhaps the executing officers don't like the way Garrison 
looks or acts or the color of his skin, perhaps they wonder about him 
because he has a previous arrest record or because he lives in the 
wrong part of town, the wrong building, or next to the wrong neigh-
bor, or perhaps they simply "suspect" that he might be involved in 
other crimes but they have no—or not enough—evidence to lawfully 
arrest or search him on that basis (remember the facts in Missouri v. 
167. Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
168. Id. at 87 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
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Blair169). If the executing officers searched Garrison's premises on 
this pretextual basis, the question then arises: would such a search 
be unconstitutional?170 
The answer, of course, is "yes." Before explaining why, let me 
respond to the nay-sayers first. Professor Haddad would apparently 
argue that the answer to this question is and should be "no," that 
the law enforcement officers' unlawful subjective intentions are to-
tally irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis, that the Supreme 
Court has not paid any attention to such subjective considerations, 
that, in any event, no attention should be paid to such pretextual ac-
tivity in any individual case. Rather, Haddad contends, the Supreme 
Court might consider changing its rule on mistaken searches pursu-
ant to search warrants in order to generally deter such pretextual 
activity.171 
The most obvious problem with this approach—aside from the 
fact that, as I have previously discussed,172 it does not reflect what 
the Supreme Court has actually said in the past nor what the law 
should be—is that in application, it ignores pretextual activity alto-
gether thus endangering the efficacy of fourth amendment law. Pre-
texts are cases where, whatever the fourth amendment rule is, it is 
not followed (except in a fictive sense). To effectively deter pretexts 
only with general rules, the Supreme Court would have to continu-
ously change every fourth amendment rule every time it saw a way 
for law enforcement officers to circumvent the rule while engaging 
in facially neutral activity. But this is impossible; law enforcement 
officers can always pretend to follow the law while not actually doing 
so. Professor Haddad concedes as much.173 As a result, changes in 
fourth amendment general rules can do little or nothing to effec-
tively deter actual pretexts. In any event, the Supreme Court has 
already crafted a general rule in Gairison, as it has in numerous other 
cases, like Opperman,174 to take account of pretexts by recognizing 
the necessity for dealing with them on a case-by-case basis and, as 
will be discussed, by permitting the use of a subjective analysis to 
boot. 
Justice Blackmar of the Missouri Supreme Court and the other 
dissenting justices in Missouri v. Blair175 would also be constrained 
on the basis of the theory propounded in their Blair dissent to up-
169. See supra text accompanying notes 87-102. 
170. A search made on this basis would be pretextual by definition. See supra 
text at note 2. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 73-85. 
173. Professor Haddad throws up his hands and says: "So be it." See supra note 
66 and accompanying text. 
174. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), discussed supra note 76 
and accompanying text and text accompanying note 146. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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hold the constitutionality of the actions of my pretextual executing 
officers in my Garrison -based hypothetical. As the dissenters argued 
in Blair, even if the officers are in fact acting without constitutional 
justification, they could have acted constitutionally, i.e., in this exam-
ple, if they had not known that they were in the wrong place, their 
action would have been objectively constitutional under the rule in 
Garrison; hence, there is no pretext. This approach leads to the same 
dysfunctional and dangerous results as Professor Haddad's ap-
proach. As I have criticized earlier,176 this result-oriented analysis, 
by failing to pay any attention to what has actually occurred, as op-
posed to the fictive possibilities, totally fails to deter any police mis-
conduct where the searching officers had the perspicacity to make 
their actions look good, even though they clearly were not. Indeed, 
using Justice Blackmar's or Professor Haddad's analyses, the search 
would be declared constitutional even if the misbehaving officers re-
peatedly confessed their unconstitutional misbehavior under oath, 
e
'g-> "We searched Garrison's apartment only because he is black," 
since a suppression court would be constrained to ignore the sub-
jective motivations of the searching officers altogether. 
But, fortunately, the Supreme Court neither endorsed nor uti-
lized the Blackmar or Haddad approaches. What did the Supreme 
Court actually say in Garrison relevant to this pretext issue? To re-
peat my question: wwould a search of Garrison's apartment be un-
constitutional if all the facts were the same as in the actual case 
except that the executing officers knew that they were in the wrong 
place? * 
The Supreme Court made it crystal clear in Garrison that such a 
pretextual search would be unconstitutional. As the Court noted 
with respect to the warrant application and issuance, "Plainly, if the 
officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two 
separate dwelling units on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue, they 
would have been obligated to exclude [Garrison's] apartment from 
the scope of the requested warrant."177 Moreover, with respect to 
the warrant's execution, the Court made exactly the same point: "If 
the officers had known, or should have known) that the third floor con-
tained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the 
third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they 
would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's 
apartment.'*178 
In short, as the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in Garri-
176. See supra text accompanying notes 114-24. 
177. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) (emphasis added). 
178. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). The Court added: "Moreover, as the officers 
recognized, they were required to discontinue the search of [Garrison's] apartment 
as soon as thev discovered that there were two separate units on the third floor 
" Id. 
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ion, if Garrison had shown—as he did not—that the executing of-
ficers in fact did not make an honest mistake, if he had shown 
instead that they knew that they were in the wrong apartment, the 
search would have been unconstitutional. It would have been un-
constitutional because it was a pretext since the officers did not have 
the lawful constitutional authority to search Garrison's apartment 
and the search was undertaken instead for reasons that did not con-
stitute a proper justification for such activity. It would have been 
unconstitutional despite the fact that the search looked objectively 
constitutional, i.e.y if we didn't know better, this looked like these 
officers honestly thought they were searching McWebb's apartment, 
and it would have been unconstitutional despite the fact that a law-
ful search of Garrison's apartment could have been made, i.e., if the 
officers had honestly and reasonably believed they were searching 
McWebb's apartment. The fact that a lawful search could have been 
made does not mean that when the police do not in fact make such a 
lawful search, we can ignore the pretext and pretend that the search 
is constitutional. 
C. O'Connor v. Ortega 
Just a few weeks after the Supreme Court's decision in Garrison, 
the Court decided another case that directly touched upon fourth 
amendment pretext issues, O'Connor v. Ortega.170 A five-justice ma-
jority of the Court (composed of a four-justice plurality and one 
concurring justice) ruled that some searches of the offices of public 
employees undertaken without probable cause by their employers 
are constitutional.180 Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion for 
four members of the Court, concluded that "public employer intru-
sions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of govern-
ment employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as 
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be 
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circum-
stances."181 Justice Scalia, who provided the fifth vote upholding 
the constitutionality of the search of public employees' offices with-
out probable cause, disagreed "with the plurality's view that the rea-
sonableness of the expectation of privacy (and thus the existence of 
Fourth Amendment protection) changes 'when an intrusion is by a 
supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.' "I82 Nonetheless, 
Justice Scalia concluded that warrantless "government searches [of 
179. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
180. The Ortega decision concerned the fourth amendment but was not a fourth 
amendment case. Rather, it was a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982) on the basis of an alleged violation of an individual's fourth amendment 
rights. 
181. 480 U.S. at 725-26 (O'Connor, J.). 
182. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the plurality opinion). 
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public employees' offices] to retrieve work-related materials or to 
investigate violations of workplace rules" are constitutional within 
the dictates of the fourth amendment.183 
The issue of pretext arose in Ortega because it was not clear 
from the record why the particular public employee office search at 
issue in that case was carried out. Since the four-justice plurality 
concluded that only public employee searches undertaken by an em-
ployer "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes . . . [or] for in-
vestigations of work-related misconduct"184 were constitutional 
when undertaken on less than probable cause, the Court re-
manded185 the case in order for the trial court to determine "iht 
actual justification for the search."1™ 
The existence of a pretext issue in Ortega should be clear from 
the Supreme Court's finding of the necessity for a remand to resolve 
the factual question of the searching agents* justification for their 
search. Dr. Ortega, whose office was searched, based much of his 
argument on a pretext claim.187 He contended, in the plurality's 
words, "that the intrusion was an investigatory search whose pur-
pose was simply to discover evidence that would be of use in admin-
istrative proceedings."1?8 The plurality ordered a remand so that 
the trial court could, inter alia, "determine the justification for the 
search and seizure."189 This is classic pretext search doctrine. If 
the search of Dr. Ortega's office was in fact undertaken for work-
related reasons, it was constitutional; if, instead, it was in fact under-
taken for investigatory reasons, it was unconstitutional (despite its 
otherwise objectively neutral appearance). « 
Justice Scalia, whose Fifth vote was necessary to form a majority, 
also turned the question of the constitutionality of this search under 
the fourth amendment on the lower court's resolution on remand of 
the question whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office was in fact "to 
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of work-
place rules.",<M) To Justice Scalia, such a motivation on the part of 
the searching agents would be, in his words, "a validating pur-
pose. " , y l The absence of such a proper purpose, in contrast, dic-
183. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
184. Id. at 725 (O 'Connor ,J ) . 
185. The Ortega decision resulted in a remand of the civil rights action because 
that was the relief ordered by both the plurality and Justice Scalia in his separate 
opinion and, hence, was the relief agreed to by a majority of the Court. 
186. OConner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (emphasis added). 
187. See Brief for Respondent In Propria Persona at 45-47, OConner v. Orteira 
480 U.S. 709 (1987); Brief of Amicus Curiae Joel Klein at 30-31, O'ConnerV 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
188. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725-26. 
189. Id. at 729. 
190. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
!9 i . Id. 8 
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lated a finding of unconstitutionality. It is hard to imagine a firmer 
endorsement from either the Ortega plurality or from Justice Scalia 
of the propositions that case-by-case analysis of pretexts is appropri-
ate and that the subjective motivation of the searching agents is im-
portant to fourth amendment pretext analysis, i.e., whether a lawful 
"validating purpose" existed for the search. 
Furthermore, there were four dissenting justices in Ortega and 
their dissenting analysis did no violence to—indeed it under-
scored—the majority's pretext doctrinal analysis. Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented be-
cause he concluded that there was no "special need" to search pub-
lic employees' offices sufficient to justify a per se exception to the 
normal fourth amendment requirements of a warrant and probable 
cause.192 Although this conclusion was dispositive for the dissent-
ers, Justice Blackmun also took issue with the plurality's analysis of 
the record facts. After reviewing the evidence in the record, primar-
ily deposition testimony about how the search was conducted, when 
it was conducted, and why it was conducted. Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that the search was indeed "plainly exceptional and investi-
gatory in nature."193 Accordingly, he castigated the plurality for 
permitting the potential application of "inventory search" rules to 
an investigative search case. In other words, Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent evaluated the objective and subjective evidence on the record 
as establishing that—whatever the searching agents or their lawyers 
claimed—this search was not actually an inventory search. The fact 
that it was not an inventory search means that it was not entitled to 
the relaxed constitutional rules that apply to such searches. This 
analysis is, of course, as in the Bertine case, a straightforward applica-
tion of a "case-by-case" pretext search doctrine using both objective 
and subjective criteria to establish the pretext. 
D. New York v. Burger 
A few weeks after ic decided Ortega, the Supreme Court in New 
York v. Burger194 handed down a decision that once again directly 
confronted the issue of the proper analysis of pretext searches. The 
primary issue in Burger was whether the warrantless search of an au-
tomobile junkyard pursuant to a New York state statute authorizing 
such searches fell within the exception to the fourth amendment 
warrant requirement carved out for administrative inspections of 
pervasively regulated industries. A six-justice majority of the Court, 
in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that it did and that, accord-
ingly, the search in question was constitutional. 
192. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 746. 
194. 107 S. Ct. 2636(1987). 
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In d iscuss ing the evidence actually discovered in this junkyard 
search, the Burger Court cited to the cryptic parenthetical language 
in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez relating to pretexts , 1 9 5 previ-
ously d iscussed, for the proposit ion that "[t]he discovery of evi-
d e n c e o f crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrate 
inspection d o e s not render that search illegal or the administrative 
s c h e m e suspect."19*1 T h e key question, of course , for pretext pur-
poses , is when is a search otherwise proper? T h e Burger Court an-
swered this important question in a lengthy footnote appended to 
the language q u o t e d above, noting the exis tence o f two different 
types o f pretexts that might make a search not "otherwise proper." 
T h e first type o f pretext mentioned is the possibility o f pretext 
o n the part o f the New York Legislature that enacted the warrantless 
junkyard inspect ion statute. T h e defendant in Burger argued that 
the legislature actually enacted the statute for criminal investiga-
tory—rather than administrative—purposes. T h e Burger Court 
seemingly accepted defendant's argument that "pretextual" legisla-
tion might be constitutionally deficient, but nonethe less ruled that 
there was n o ev idence o f such pretext on the record in this case: 
" T h e legislative history of [this statute], in general , and [the inspec-
tion sub-sec t ion] , in particular, reveals that the New York Legisla-
ture had properly [sic] regulatory purposes for enact ing the 
administrative s c h e m e and was not using it as a 'pretext' to enable 
law enforcement authorities to gather ev idence o f penal law 
v io la t ions ." 1 9 7 
T h e s e c o n d type o f pretext noted by tjie Burger Court is the type 
o f pretext d i scussed throughout this Article, namely searches made 
by agents o f the state, usually law enforcement officers, for reasons 
that d o not const i tute a proper legal justification for such activity. 
T h e Burger Court d e e m e d the case before it constitutional in pan 
because there was n o pretext since the reasons for making the search 
in this case did in fact constitute a proper legal justification for mak-
ing such an administrative search. In Justice Blackmun's words, 
speaking for the majority of the Court, ' T h e r e is . . . n o reason to 
bel ieve that the instant inspection was actually a 'pretext' for ob-
taining ev idence o f [defendant's] violation o f penal laws. It is undis-
puted that the inspection was made solely pursuant to the 
administrative s c h e m e . " 1 9 8 In short, the implication o f this lan-
g u a g e is that if the "inspect ion" was not made for proper administra-
195. See discussion of VUlamonte-Marquez, supra text accompanying notes 15-31. 
196. 107. S. Ct. at 2651 (emphasis added, footnote and citation to VillamonU-
Marquez omitted). 
197. Id. at 2651 n.27 (citations omitted). The Court added that "an administra-
tive scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws, even if its regula-
tory goals are narrower." Id. at 2659. 
198. Id. at 2651 n.27. 
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live reasons, but rather was made for investigatory reasons (without 
probable cause or other lawful antecedent justification), the search 
would have been unconstitutional. 
That implicit suggestion, that such pretextual administrative 
searches are unconstitutional, was made explicit in Justice Black-
mun's next sentence, where he added that "[i]n fact, because the 
search here was truly a[n administrative] inspection, the [New York] 
Court of Appeals was able to reach in this case, as it could not in 
People v. Pace, the question of the constitutionality of the statute."199 
This reference by the Supreme Court in Burger to the Pace deci-
sion is important if cryptic standing alone and needs some explana-
tion. The reason that the New York Court of Appeals in Pace did not 
reach the question of the constitutionality of the junkyard adminis-
trative search statute—indeed, "could not" reach this question, in the 
United States Supreme Court's view—was that the Pace case—unlike 
Burger—involved a pretextual administrative search. The New York 
Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence seized in Pace because, on 
the facts on record, <4[t]he warrantless search of defendants* auto-
mobile salvage yard was not undertaken for administrative pur-
poses."200 Indeed, it is notable that the record facts in Pace 
established pretext strictly on the basis of the (subjective) testimo-
nial evidence given by the searching officers' detailing their actual, 
unlawful motivations for searching. As the Appellate Division of the 
New York Supreme Court concluded, 4t[T]he [searching] police of-
ficers expressly maintained that their mission was to gather evidence 
of a crime rather than to administer any regulatory scheme. When a 
search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection the administrative 
March rationale is simply inapplicable . . . ."2(H In short, the Pace decision 
was o n e which held dispositive the fact that pretextual search and 
seizure activity is ipso facto unconstitutional when subjective evidence 
is utilized to establish the pretext. T h e United States Supreme 
Court majority cited this decis ion with evident approval in Burger, 
expressly contrasting it with the facts in Burger where there was no 
pretext and where, for that reason, the search was found to be 
constitutional. 
Furthermore, the three dissenting just ices in Burger completely 
agreed with the majority's analysis that such pretext searches are 
unconstitutional. Indeed, the dissenters took the analysis o n e step 
further; they also conc luded, unlike the majority, that the Burger case 
was in fact a case o f unconstitutional pretext and that the evidence 
seized should , accordingly, be suppressed on that basis. In Justice 
Brennan's words , 44[T]he State has used an administrative scheme as 
199. Id. (citation omitted). 
200. People v. Pace, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d 618, (1985). 
201. People v. Pace, 101 A.D.2d 336, 340. 475 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (1984) (em-
phasis added, citations omitted). 
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a pretext to search without probable cause for evidence of criminal 
violations. It thus circumvented the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment by altering the label placed on the search.*'202 Such 
conduct, Justice Brennan made clear, citing numerous Supreme 
Court decisions, violates established fourth amendment doctrine re-
lating to the unconstitutionality of pretexts.203 What is more, Jus-
tice Brennan added, failure to recognize the significance of ignoring 
such pretexts threatens the efficacy of any fourth amendment rules. 
As his dissent concluded, "The implications of the Court's opinion, 
if realized, will virtually eliminate Fourth Amendment protection of 
commercial entities in the context of administrative searches. No 
State may require, as a condition of doing business, a blanket sub-
mission to warrantless searches for any purpose/'204 Exactly. 
202. New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2656 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
203. Justice Brennan explained: 
In the law of administrative searches, one principle emerges with unusual 
clarity and unanimous acceptance: the government may not use an admin-
strative inspection scheme to search for criminal violations. See Michigan 
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292. 104 S. Ct. 641, 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) 
(opinion of Powell, J.) (in fire investigation, the constitutionality of a post-
fire inspection depends upon "whether the object of the search is to deter-
mine the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity"); 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.499, 508, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L. Ed. 2d 
486 (1978) (" 'if the authorities are seeking evidence to be used in a crimi-
nal prosecution, the usual standard of probable cause will apply' ") (cita-
tions omitted); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at 598, n.6, 101 S. Ct., at 
2538, n.6 ("[warrant and probable cause requirements] pertain when com-
mercial properly is searched for contraband or evidence of crime"); Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2542, 
37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973) (Powell. J., concurring) (traditional probable 
cause not required in border automobile searches because they are "un-
dertaken primarily for administrative rather than prosecutorial pur-
poses"); Carnara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 539, 87 S. Ct.. at 1736 
(authorization of administrative searches on less than probable cause will 
not "endange(r| time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investiga-
tions"); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S., at 549. 87 S. Ct., at 1742 (Clark, J., 
dissenting) ("nothing . . . suggests that the inspection was . . . designed as 
a basis for a criminal prosecution"); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 
226, 80 S. Ct. 683, 690, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960) ("[t]he deliberate use by 
the Government of an administrative warrant for the purpose of gathering 
evidence in a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts"); id. 
at 248, 80 S. Ct. at 701 (Douglas J., dissenting) (Government cannot evade 
the Fourth Amendment "by the simple device of wearing the masks of 
(administrative] officials while in fact they are preparing a case for criminal 
prosecution"); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365, 79 S. Ct. 804, 808, 3 
L. Ed. 2d 877 (1959) ("evidence of criminal action may not . . . be seized 
without a judicially issued search warrant"). 
Id. at 2655 (footnote omitted). 
204. Id. at 2657-58. 
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V. CONCLUSION: MISSOURI r. BI^IH REDUX 
The import of the four recent Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussed above is that they provide the answers to the fourth amend-
ment pretext search doctrine questions that were before the Court 
in Missouri v. Blair, but which were left unanswered when the Court 
cryptically dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.205 
The first question before the Court in Blair was as follows: 
(1) Was the Blair Court correct in applying a case-by-case 
pretext analysis? Or, put another way, was the Blair Court 
correct in assuming that suppression of evidence seized as 
a result of pretextual fourth amendment activity was com-
pelled or otherwise appropriate? 
There is absolutely no question when the Supreme Court's de-
risions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and Burger are considered that the 
Blair Court's use of a case-by-case analysis of pretexts, compelling a 
finding of unconstitutionality where relevant pretexts are estab-
lished, was correct. Ail of the opinions in all four of those cases 
cither used or implicitly accepted such an analysis. There was never 
even a suggestion in any of those cases that Professor Haddad's 
"hard-choice" approach reflected settled fourth amendment policy 
or had subsumed the necessity for—or the appropriateness of—con-
sideration of pretexts on a case-by-case basis. 
The second question before the Supreme Court in Blair was as 
follows: 
(2) Was the Blair Court majority correct in ruling that 
when the record evidence established that an arrest was 
made in bad faith, i.e., as a pretextual means to arrest and 
acquire evidence about a crime where there was no prob-
able cause, the arrest was ipso facto unconstitutional? Or, in 
contrast, were the Blair Court dissenters correct in arguing 
that where the record established that a lawful parking 
arrest could be made, it does not matter how or why such an 
arrest was actually made? 
Again, all of the opinions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and Burger 
directly or indirectly support the view of the Blair Court majority 
that such "bad faith" fourth amendment activity is unconstitutional. 
The Bertine Court made this point most cogently, finding inventory 
searches of the contents of impounded vehicles unconstitutional 
where the searching officers "acted in bad faith or for the sole pur-
pose of investigation."206 Furthermore, the Garrison majority opin-
ion would appear to make it clear that the Missouri Supreme Court 
205. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
206. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). 
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dissenters* view in Blair that fourth amendment activity can be justi-
fied on the basis of what could have happened rather than what did 
happen is quite simply incorrect.207 
Finally, the third question put before the Court by the parties in 
Blair (although unnecessary to a decision) was as follows: 
(3) Is the subjective motivation of the searching or arrest-
ing officers—their bad faith (or lack thereof)—properly 
considered in assessing whether or not there is a cogniza-
ble pretext? 
Once again, all of the opinions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and 
Burger directly or indirectly used or accepted the use of such subjec-
tive criteria where it was necessary, i.e., where the objective evidence 
was facially neutral, and where it was otherwise available and rele-
vant. In particular, the Bertine majority expressly adopted a test for 
pretext including a subjective t4bad faith'* analysis, the Garrison ma-
jority used subjective evidence of motivation to determine the con-
stitutionality of a search, the Ortega Court turned the ultimate 
resolution of that case on evidence of the searchers* actual motives 
for searching, and the Burger majority noted that subjective evidence 
of pretext could be dispositive of the issue of constitutionality, while 
the Burger Court dissenters found evidence of pretext on the record 
and, indeed, ruled that it was dispositive. 
In short, while a Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Blair 
would have been the surest and most direct way to obtain resolution 
of the most troubling questions raised by a few judges and commen-
tators relating to the existence and content of the pretext search 
doctrine, the four recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above 
answered all of the questions raised in Blair—and then some. Lower 
court opinions that state or imply that the Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, 
or any other Supreme Court decision handed down prior to Bertine, 
Garrison, Ortega, and Burger, have commanded the evisceration of a 
workable pretext search doctrine are, quite simply, in the light of 
these recent rulings, dead wrong.208 These decisions make it clear 
beyond peradventure that pretext searches are unconstitutional 
and, further, that it is appropriate to utilize evidence of searching 
officers* motivation in determining constitutionality. Whether or 
not the pretext search doctrine ever left, it has returned. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79. 
208. See, ?.#., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). The Causey 
majority opinion, which was based in large part upon a mistaken reading of Scott 
and rillamonte~.\/ai(/uez, flatly "validated so-called pretextual arrest warrants." 
United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179. 182 n.I (5th Cir. 1988). 
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